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professorship at the University of Rijeka in Croatia. Perica lives with his wife in Baltimore, 
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ABSTRACT 
According to beliefs of religious nationalism, a nation is a community of ancestors and 
descendants, dead and living, past and present. As such, it incorporates within its territory all 
past and present markers of nationhood, notably historic religious monuments as the physical 
evidence of the perennial existence of the religious and ethnic community that is, in the 
nationalist imagination, of the nation. Thus, the history of the shrines and monuments, as told in 
religious tales and preserved in the rituals, is the history of the nation. In many parts of the 
world, contesting claims to consecrated territories clash. The struggles evolve into holy wars 
between good and evil and angels and demons. The enmity cemented by religion does not end 
until demythologization of history or until one side or the other has been destroyed. At the same 
time, in a globalized world, narratives of ethnic and religious nationalisms are no longer isolated 
from each other as they used to be. In recent decades, they have observed each other and 
borrowed and influenced one another. The case under consideration comparatively observes the 
conflicts in Kosovo in the Balkan and in Israel-Palestine in order to critically examine the 
nationalist and religious politics behind the nationalist discourses on history and religion, the past 
and the present, and the sacred and the secular.  
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1. Introduction 
 Since the national self-determination debates at the Paris Peace conference a hundred 
years ago, the Balkans and the Middle East have become presumably the most instructive 
laboratories for students of nationalist struggles and unfinished nation-formation. A hundred 
years ago, two men of the hour, American President Wilson and Russian communist leader 
Lenin, proclaimed the “right” to national self-determination although no world leader to this day 
has elaborated who, when, and how to achieve it peacefully.1 Since then, various nationalist 
movements have become involved in territorial disputes often inciting regional wars.2 Wilson 
insisted on democratic legitimation for nationalist claims through plebiscites verified by the 
international community that would show the will of the majority population in often-contested 
territories. Well in advance of the Paris Peace conference, various nationalist movements, all of 
them referring to Wilson’s points and principles, had become involved in territorial disputes 
threatening regional wars. Seeking stability and making the new world order, the peacemakers at 
Paris deployed multinational peacekeeping forces in areas of nationalist conflict to buy time to 
study maps and books in history and anthropology to adjudicate contesting claims.3 Nationalist 
movements in conflict, particularly in imperial and colonial domains or within ethnically 
heterogeneous states with separatist-minded groups, have typically justified their claims to 
territory and sovereignty, either by an ethnic majority principle or by “historical rights” invoking 
earlier forms of autonomy, statehood, or cultural influence, or by various combinations of these 
principles.  
 
1 Joseph S. Nye, “The Who, Where, and When of Secession”, 29. 09. 2017 at PS online, https://www.project-
syndicate.org/commentary/self-determination-problems-catalonia-kurdistan-by-joseph-s--nye-2017-09. 
2See Erez Manela, The Wilsonian Moment: Self-Determination and the International Origins of Anti-Colonial 
Nationalism, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007). 
3 Margaret MacMillan, Paris 1919: Six Months That Changed the World, (New York: Random House, 2002). 
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 Managing the early post-World War I national self-determination claims and territorial 
disputes, Woodrow Wilson hoped to help the implementation of the majority principle if asserted 
through plebiscites and democratic elections showing the “consent of the governed” regarding 
the government under which they chose to live. In an international controversy that the U.S. 
press followed on front pages after the Great War, Wilson alienated hundreds of thousands of 
Democratic Party’s voters of Italian ancestry by rejecting Italy’s claims on the East Adriatic 
based on the historical rights.4 Italy first attempted territorial gains based on secret wartime 
treaties with the Allies, which Wilson had earlier condemned. Then, Italian representatives at the 
peace conference argued (correctly) that the tiny Italian urban communities with an evident 
tradition, archeology, and Latin influence dominate Dalmatian cities culturally over the Slavic 
majority population. Wilson nevertheless supported the Slavic majority’s claims and even sent in 
battleships to prevent Italian annexation of the disputed territory.5 Wilson saw the South Slavs as 
a potential and promising nation developing with western assistance and defending the West 
against communist Russia. He disregarded the particular ethnicities within the Slavic ethnic core, 
which continued demanding their own particular rights to national self-determination.6  
 At the same time in Palestine, Britain and America did not back the Arab majority against 
the Jewish minority. On the contrary, the two world powers supported the Jewish minority with 
historic rights seeking to restore ancient statehood and claiming the territory marked by 
narratives, memories, and historic landmarks from the period of that ancient statehood and by 
memories of the long persecution of stateless Jews longing for the “sacred act of return” to their 
original homeland. Both Arab and Zionist representatives were invited to present their cases 
 
4“Dalmatian Coast Likely to be Slav; But Fiume May go to Italy in Settlement of Adriatic Problem – America is the 
Umpire,” New York Times, 02.02.1919; see Vjekoslav Perica, Pax Americana in the Adriatic and the Balkans, 1919-
2014 (In Croatian), (Zagreb: Algoritam, Mostar: Algoritam Stanek, 2015), p.35. 
5 See the details in Perica, Pax Americana, pp. 33-117. 
6 Manela, The Wilsonian Moment, pp. 7 and 59. 
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before the Paris Peace conference. Evidently, the idea of a “Jewish national homeland in 
Palestine” received support not only from Britain but also from Wilson and the United States.7 
The Zionist movement could not win a plebiscite in Palestine so that the world powers allowed a 
precedent by recognizing the minority’s claims based on history, religion, and persecution while 
actually denying the right to national self-determination to the majority population.8 However, it 
seems improbable that either Wilson or Lenin anticipated a future for conservative and religious 
variants of nationalism. Although the former was religious and the latter atheist, both shared 
modernist and secularist understanding of nationhood. The two did not imagine nation as a 
perennial, mystical, and timeless sacred community of ancestors and descendants with a state 
that should incorporate all places of memory, former and present territories—as the dominant 
type of nationalism would a hundred years later. 
 Ever since then, the case of Palestine has exemplified a territorial conflict between the 
historic versus the majority rights and other disputes emphasizing history, memory, religion, and 
suffering. Eight decades later, a Serbian nationalist movement would argue that the Serbs are the 
Jews of the Balkans. An ethnic Serb minority of the Kosovo region, in conflict with majority 
ethnic Albanians, would claim the territory and statehood based on historic rights as evident 
from memories, religious rituals, narratives and monuments about Serb ancient kingdom in the 
disputed area. To make the Serb case even more similar to the Jewish, the Serb movement would 
also emphasize self-sacrifice and persecution of Serbs ever since the fourteenth century Ottoman 
conquest of the Balkans and particularly in the Second World War. 
 At any rate, since the peacemaking and boundary-drawing at the Paris Peace conference, 
the international conflict management had to deal with nationalist movements arguing over the 
 
7 Ibid., p. 59. 
8 “Balfour Declaration Centenary: Read The Historic Letter Pledging British Support For The Creation Of Israel,” 
The Independent, 29. 10. 2017. 
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evidence of “who got there first,” who suffered more, and how state boundaries should be 
(re)drawn to carefully consider historic and sacred sites. Some recent studies found the cases of 
the conflicts in Israel-Palestine and the Balkans comparable and instructive particularly when 
observed in a wider global-comparative perspective.9  
 The conflicts of this kind, sometimes described as ethnic, religious, historical, or 
perennial, seem ancient although they are of recent origins. Even the crucial influence of religion 
is new. A hundred years ago, the world of Wilson and Lenin was probably religious as it always 
had been, yet religion was arguably less influential in international relations and public affairs. 
Yet, since the concluding decades of the twentieth century, religion has evidently influenced the 
remaking of the world order and the idea of the secular state.10 The secular ideologies that 
Wilson and Lenin represent have lost much of their appeal, while religion, culture and identity 
shape policies and strategies of state building and national development.11 The shift has 
occurred, as Samuel P. Huntington has suggested, at the end of the twentieth century in a de-
secularized, post-ideological, and globalizing world with religious violence among the emblems 
of the new era.12  
 
 
9 Sumantra Bose, Contested Lands: Israel-Palestine, Kashmir, Bosnia, Cyprus, and Sri Lanka. (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 2007); Beáta Huszka, Secessionist Movements and Ethnic Conflict: Debate-Framing and 
Rhetoric in Independence Campaigns. (Abingdon, Oxon; New York, NY: Routledge, 2014). 
10 Peter L. Berger, ed., The Desecularization of the World: Resurgent Religion and World Politics. (Washington, 
D.C.: Ethics and Public Policy Center, Grand Rapids, Mich.: W.B. Eerdmans Pub. Co., 1999); Thomas M. Scott. 
The Global Resurgence of Religion and the Transformation of International Relations: The Struggle for the Soul of 
the Twenty-First Century, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan US, 2005); Mark Juergensmeyer. The New Cold War? : 
Religious Nationalism Confronts the Secular State. Berkeley : University of California Press, 1993; Craig Calhoun, 
Mark Juergensmeyer, and Jonathan VanAntwerpen, eds. Rethinking Secularism. (Oxford, N.Y. : Oxford University 
Press, 2011). 
11 Elizabeth Shakman Hurd, Beyond Religious Freedom: the New Global Politics of Religion. (Princeton, New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2015); Anna Grzymala-Busse, Nations Under God. How Churches use Moral 
Authority to Influence Policy. (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2015). 
12 Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. hardcover ed., (New York: 
Simon & Schuster, 2011); Mark Juergensmeyer, Global Rebellion: Religious Challenges to the Secular State, from 
Christian Militias to al Qaeda. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008). 
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2. 1. Importing Serbian Jerusalem in World Affairs    
 
 The restructuring of nations in southeastern Europe is an unfinished process that has 
begun in the two last decades of the twentieth century. The destruction of the Yugoslav 
federation was not an incident but a longer process initiated by a massive nationalist movement 
that originated in the largest Yugoslav federal republic of Serbia that spread to Kosovo, Slovenia, 
Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and elsewhere in the region. The Serb movement began by 
disputing autonomy of the Kosovo province in which ethnic Albanians, mostly Muslims, sought 
greater autonomy. The minority Christian Serbs opposed it, describing the Albanians as 
successors of the Ottoman oppressors. Kosovo Albanians, according to the allegations publicized 
in the 1980s, planned to expel Serbs and destroy their historic monuments, churches, 
monasteries, and historic sites commemorating a Serb medieval kingdom and the 1389 battle 
against the invading Ottoman Turks at the Kosovo field, both crucial for Serb national identity. 
The Serbian Orthodox Church was the first Serb institution that dared, as early as the 1960s, to 
publicize that Kosovo Albanians allegedly persecuted the Church and expelled the local Kosovo 
Serbs.13 The Kosovo dispute of the 1980s escalated into a wider regional conflict and several 
cycles of bloody ethnic and civil wars that involved several former Yugoslav republic and ethnic 
nations.14  
 
13 See Vjekoslav Perica, Balkan idols: Religion and Nationalism in Yugoslav States. (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2002), pp. 43-55 and 123-165. 
14 See more about the Yugoslav disintegration and the Balkan wars of the 1990s in Sabrina P. Ramet, Balkan Babel: 
the Disintegration of Yugoslavia from the Death of Tito to the Fall of Milošević, 4th ed., (Boulder, Colorado: 
Westview Press, 2002); Thinking about Yugoslavia: Scholarly Debates about the Yugoslav Breakup and the Wars in 
Bosnia and Kosovo. (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Škeljzen Malići. Kosovo and the 
Disintegration of Yugoslavia (Kosovo i raspad Jugoslavije, razgovor vodio Baton Hadžiu, preveo s albanskog Anton 
Berišaj). (Beograd: Links, Mostart, 2014); Erich Rathfelder. Kosovo: History of a Conflict (Kosovo: Geschichte 
eines Konflikts), 1st ed., Aufl., Originalausg.(Berlin: Suhrkamp, 2010). 
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 Following the disintegration of Yugoslavia, the ethnic civil wars of the 1990s, seven new 
states eventually emerged in the area, including an independent Republic of Kosovo. After the 
Serb-Albanian war in Kosovo and the 1999-2000 NATO intervention paved the way to Kosovo 
independence, the United States established a major military base and maintained an 
international coalition to stabilize the region. The militarily weakened Serbia did not surrender. 
The Serbian Orthodox Church and nationalist parties intensified the propaganda about the 
alleged Albanian genocide, refusing to recognize Kosovo statehood and lobbied worldwide for 
recognition and defense of Serbia historic rights and Christian cultural heritage endangered by 
Albanian ethnic nationalism and a growing Muslim extremism. Unable to deny an overwhelming 
ethnic Albanian majority in Kosovo, Serbia claimed the territory on historical grounds. Kosovo 
is presented as the center of large kingdom under an ethnic Serb dynasty as well as a major 
regional sacred center surviving five centuries of Muslim conquest. The Church published an 
encyclopedia showing the well-preserved cultural heritage including several hundred churches, 
monasteries, cemeteries in Kosovo and Metohija (the first term denotes the Field of Black Birds, 
that is the historic battlefield of 1389, and the second the monastery-owned land).15 Church 
leaders hoped to keep the land with the monasteries within the Serbian state. Alternatively, the 
Church initially considered territorial partition (followed by annexation by Serbia of the most 
important monasteries) and autonomous status exempted from Albanian authority as for example 
the Patriarchate of Peć used to be during some periods of Ottoman rule. Since the 2008 
proclamation of Kosovo independence, Serbia’s state and church leaders have more often 
referred to Kosovo as “Serbian Jerusalem” meaning “the holiest place” or “holy land,” leaving 
 
15 Slobodan Mileusnić, ed., Monasteries of Serbia: Large Illustrated Encyclopedia, vols. 1-2, translation into 
English Alice Copple-Tošić. (Novi Sad: Pravoslavna reč, 2002); Slobodan Mileusnić, ed. The Monasteries of 
Kosovo and Metohija, 2nd ed., (Novi Sad: Pravoslavna reč, 2001). 
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other meanings and connotations vague until Patriarch Irenej espoused the comparison between 
Serbs and Jews as the most severely persecuted peoples.  
 In his 2017 Christmas message, the head of the Serbian Orthodox Church, Patriarch 
Irenej, stated: “We pray for the Crucified Kosovo and Metohija, the land that is our spiritual and 
national cradle, the land that the great bishop-poet Njegoš named “the grand tribunal of history.” 
As long as Serbs live, Kosovo lives also. Kosovo is soul of the Serb! For that reason Kosovo will 
always be Serb land, because our Golgotha and our Jerusalem are there!”16 The Patriarch mainly 
reiterated his 2015 Kosovo statement at a local religious festival: “For the Serbs, Kosovo is holy 
land, our Jerusalem, and our Palestine. Serbs have always defended their holy places. We will 
again protect our heritage in the Kosovo, by all our human resources and by all available means. 
If necessary, we will shed blood to defend what is ours, what our Lord has endowed to us.”17 
Since the 1980s, Serb Church leaders have only sporadically used the Jerusalem metaphor 
referring to Kosovo. The Patriarch Irenej, enthroned in 2010, promoted “Serbian Jerusalem” into 
a new dominant religious discourse. 
 Serbian political leaders, and particularly the new state diplomacy after the proclamation 
of Kosovo independence, borrowed the Jerusalem metaphor from nationalist writers and Church 
leaders. Aware of the disrepute of the Balkans as the infamous zone of conflict and the most 
backward periphery of which Western and Central Europe have long been ashamed,18 the new 
Serbian diplomacy espoused the Serbian Jerusalem metaphor as an explanatory and propaganda 
tool. The objective was to make Serbia and Kosovo seem more relevant in world politics by 
 
16 Patriarch Irenej’s Christmas Letter (“Dok je Srba, biće i Kosova i Metohije, ono će ostati naša zemlja),” Blic, 03. 
01. 2017, at http://www.blic.rs/vesti/drustvo/bozicna-poslanica-patrijarha-irineja-dok-je-srba-bice-i-kosova-i-
metohije-ono-ce/385vewj. 
17 “Kosovo is Serbian Jerusalem” (Kosovo je srpski Jerusalim),” Večernje novosti, Belgrade, 25. 11.; 
Peščanik,  http://pescanik.net, 28.11.2015. 
18 See Maria Todorova, Imagining the Balkans, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997). 
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suggesting parallels with the Middle East, Israel, and Palestine, as global issues of highest 
relevance and constant mass media attention. In 2010, foreign minister Vuk Jeremić said in an 
interview to the German media: “Serbia should not be forced to decide between EU membership 
and Kosovo … Kosovo has deep historical and spiritual meaning for the people of Serbia. In a 
certain sense, it is our Jerusalem.”19 On another occasion, in explaining the Kosovo controversy 
to an American audience, Jeremić stated:  
 We Serbs have an unbreakable bond with Kosovo. Here’s what Patriarch Pavle, who led 
 our Church for almost twenty years said about Kosovo: “It is the wellspring of the 
 Serbian spiritual tradition, and of our statehood; the heart and soul of our nation—
 indivisible and essential. That is why our forefathers consecrated its soil with thousands 
 of beautiful garlands: adorning the land with magnificent churches and monasteries 
 dedicated to the glory of God … Kosovo is our Valley Forge and Yorktown, our Alamo 
 and Gettysburg, our Pearl Harbor and Iwo Jima—all rolled into one. It is in our dreams 
 at night, and in our prayers in church. It is the ‘apple of our eye.’ It is our Jerusalem.”20 
 
 The military loss of Kosovo and the massive exodus of Kosovo Serbs to Serbia invoked 
the mythical narratives and inspired the religious discourses in Serbian nationalism. The 
Church’s influence grew compensating for the weakened and corrupt state in a society 
devastated by wars, international sanctions, and failing post-communist transition. The Church 
offered the people a new history in which Serbia had always been a righteous party, while 
sacrifices and losses were only temporary and moral investment was needed for a future renewal. 
Anticipating post-war negotiations and diplomatic battles for Kosovo and other disputed 
territories across the Balkans, Serb leaders began explaining the historic rights to the world. For 
example, Alexandar Karađorđević, the son of king Peter II ousted by Yugoslav communists, 
 
19 Serbian Foreign Minister Vuk Jeremić: “Kosovo 'Is Our Jerusalem',” Spiegel Online International, 31.05.2010, 
http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/serbian-foreign-minister-vuk-jeremic-kosovo-is-our-jerusalem-a-
697725.html. 
20 “Minister of Foreign Affairs H.E. Vuk Jeremić Address at the Wheaton College, ‘Identity, Reconciliation, and the 
Struggle over Kosovo,’” 17.03. 2011, Embassy of the Republic of Serbia, Washington D.C., 
http://www.serbiaembusa.org/newstext.php?subaction=showfull&id=1300460897&archive=&start_from=&ucat=19 
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during the NATO bombing of Belgrade in 1999, sent a letter to presidents of the USA and 
France and to the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, emphasizing that, 
 “France, United Kingdom and the United States have been traditional allies of Serbia in 
the West. That makes me wonder has the use of NATO air strikes against Serbia been the only 
appropriate answer to the failure of diplomatic negotiations. In the two world wars, history has 
shown that my people does not respond favorably to ultimatums and pressures. Moreover, it 
should not be forgotten that Kosovo is a Serbian Jerusalem and a cradle of the Serbian state. The 
greatest sacred monuments, part of the Serbian heritage, are located in Kosovo … Kosovo is an 
inalienable part of Serbia and Serbs have the right to defend what is theirs …”21 
 Although it sounds appealing and seductive, the nationalist discourse about Serbian 
Jerusalem, like most nationalist manipulations with the past for present purposes, is an invented 
tradition. According to Hobsbawm and Ranger, the invention of tradition involves “modern 
nationalist practices of using ancient materials to construct invented tradition of a novel type for 
quite novel purposes … the new traditions use old materials, invent new language or devices, 
extend the old symbolic vocabulary beyond established limits …”22 Applied to the uses of the 
past about Kosovo, Kosovo is not, to begin with, a “cradle” of the Serbian nation. Neither 
medieval nor modern Serbia were founded within borders of present-day Kosovo. Modern Serbia 
developed in what is today northern Serbia at a lengthy distance from Kosovo and other southern 
regions. The memory and later state patriotic myth about the medieval empire and its downfall at 
the 1389 Kosovo medieval battle are narratives and practices of nation building inaugurated in 
 
21 “Kosovo is Our Cradle and Our Jerusalem.” (Kosovo Je naša kolevka i Srpski Jerusalim), Telegraf online, 07. 04. 
1999, http://www.telegraf.rs/vesti/politika/2062632-kosovo-je-nasa-kolevka-i-srpski-jerusalim-ovo-je-kralj-srbije-
porucio-klintonu-bleru-i-siraku-tokom-bombardovanja-srbije. 
22 Eric J. Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, The Invention of Tradition. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1983), pp. 6-7. 
OCCASIONAL PAPERS ON RELIGION IN EASTERN EUROPE (DECEMBER 2017) XXXVII, 6 32
the nineteenth century.23 Medieval Serbia, including both church and state, was founded in the 
thirteenth century in central Serbia, outside borders of the present-day Kosovo. Kosovo 
historically signifies the area of the later fourteenth-century imperial expansion of the Serbian 
state and temporary seat of the Church under Ottoman rule in the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries. In short, the new Serbian nationalism since the 1980s has invented and magnified the 
importance of Kosovo to the proportions of a Jerusalem and a holy land of the Serbs. The 
purpose of revitalizing the medieval narrative of the lost pride and revenge was the post-
Yugoslav and post-communist mass mobilization of Serbs for the Greater Serbia project. In other 
words, as the contemporary political discourse would put it: making Serbia great again.  
 
2.2.  From Cradle to Golden Age: Imprecise Metaphors, Invented Traditions, Myths of 
Nationhood  
 Medieval Serbia originated in the early thirteenth century in the province of Rascia/Raška 
in present-day central Serbia. Almost a century later, the earliest Serb state later expanded to 
Kosovo (after the Field of Black Birds, later the Kosovo battlefield) and Metohija (denoting 
monastery-owned land) in the present-day Kosovo. This part of what would be later, when 
modern Serbia re-emerged at the northern capital Belgrade, called Old Serbia, is the actual 
“cradle” of Serbia. Because there, not in Kosovo, the princes and bishops of the Nemanjić 
dynasty established an independent kingdom and a self-governing Christian Church of the 
Byzantine rite and ruled there for more than a hundred years prior to the foundation of an 
imperial capital and a supreme church authority in Kosovo. The principal shrine and historic 
monument where the Church independence was proclaimed is the monastery of Studenica in the 
 
23 Ivan Čolović, Death at the Kosovo Field: History of the Kosovo Myth (Smrt na Kosovu polju. Istorija Kosovskog 
mita). (Belgrade. Biblioteka xx vek, 2016). 
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village Studenica, Commune of Kraljevo, Raška District, Republic of Serbia.24 Established in the 
late twelfth century by Stevan Nemanja, founder of the medieval Serb state, Studenica is the 
largest of Serbia’s medieval monasteries. Its two principal monuments, the Church of the Virgin 
and the Church of the King, both built of white marble, enshrine priceless collections of 
thirteenth and fourteenth century Byzantine paintings. UNESCO posted Studenica on World 
Heritage List in 1986, two decades before any of the Kosovo monasteries. Another key sacred 
historic monument from this earliest period of Serbian statehood is the monastery Žića, located 
in the heartland of Serbia. Žića lies at the distance of about 300 kilometers to the west from 
Priština, the present-day capital of Kosovo, and about 250 km from the Kosovo town of Peć 
(Ipek), the later seat of the patriarchate. At the Žića monastery built by King Stefan of the 
Nemanjić dynasty and his son Sava, in 1219, a church council proclaimed an independent 
archdiocese of the Serbian Orthodox Church electing Sava as the archbishop. The Žića 
monastery is the place of coronation of the first Serb ruler Stefan and six other Serb kings. There, 
the first head of the Church was enthroned. In short, the earliest and oldest, historically most 
important Serb monasteries are Žića, Studenica and Sopoćani.  Hilandar, the most important 
Serbian holy place outside Serbia, is in Greece, built atop the Holy Mountain Athos in Greece.25 
The four holiest and historically most relevant churches and monasteries, and the indisputably 
major saintly cult of the church’s founder and the state’s co-founder, St. Sava, are all located in 
Serbia outside Kosovo. Although there are hundreds of more or less preserved Serb historic 
monuments in Kosovo, only two, namely the old Patriarchate at Peć and the Dečani monastery, 
 
24 See Medieval Monuments in Kosovo (UNESCO/NHK), https://youtu.be/5Q6DzpisSOM 
25 Stefan Nemanja, head of the Nemanjić Dynasty and the Grand prince of Serbia, and his son Saint Sava (Rastko 
Nemanjić) founded the Hilandar in 1198. Both Stefan (as monk Symeon) and Sava retreated to Hilandar after 
retirement from church and state affairs. Hilandar became the center of medieval Serbian culture, periodically 
reactivated in later centuries in support of Serbia’s foreign policy. See Dimitrije Bogdanović, Hilandar. 
(Beograd: Jugoslovenska revija, 1978); Radmila Radić, “Hilandar u državnoj politici Kraljevine Srbije i Jugoslavije 
1886-1970. godine,” Službeni list SRJ, Beograd, 1998. 
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possibly match the historical importance of the four holiest and oldest churches and monasteries 
of Old Serbia. The two, like the Gračanica Memorial Church at the Kosovo battlefield and other 
sacred historic landmarks of Kosovo, are relevant, yet they do not make Kosovo the place of the 
state’s origin and foundation or “cradle” of Serbia.  
 Most importantly, the old Serbia and its main shrines are associated with the highest Serb 
Orthodox saintly cult of Saint Sava (Rastko Nemanjić). Sava, the founding father of the state, 
church, and nation lived in Serbia, travelled to Jerusalem and Greece, died in Bulgaria, and 
probably never visited Kosovo. Sava mediated in dynastic feuds and obtained an independent 
church via diplomacy balancing between the Ecumenical patriarchate in Constantinopolis and 
Rome. Sava’s cult celebrates an independent statehood and church autonomy won by diplomacy. 
The oldest preserved portrait of Saint Sava as the first Serbian archbishop is a fresco from the 
Ascension church of Mileševa monastery, foundation of Serbian king Vladislav, 1222-1228. This 
monastery was Sava’s original burial place yet his major memorial temple was built in Belgrade 
commemorating Ottoman Turkish ritual burning of Sava’s relics in the sixteenth century. St. 
Sava is also the founder of what would be later described as a “Serbian Jerusalem”—a chapel 
and guesthouse for Serb pilgrims to the Holy Land.26 
  When the early Serbian kingdom was well established, the Church’s seat relocated to 
Kosovo, which signifies not the birth or foundation but the kingdom’s expansion into an empire. 
This stage developed under the emperor Dušan the Mighty who was the most powerful of all 
Serb rulers yet never became a saint of the Serbian Orthodox Church. The Church’s seat 
relocated to Peć (Ipek) in Kosovo exemplifies two things: first, the domination of Serbs over the 
neighboring Balkan peoples under Dušan the Mighty and second, the survival of some form of 
 
26 Dinko Davidov, Serbs and Jerusalem (Srbi i Jerusalim), edited by Jovo Vukelić, art editor Dobrilo M. Nikolić, 
(Belgrade: Politika AD, 2007). 
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Serb self-government under Ottoman rule. Imperial Kosovo is associated with the rise of Stefan 
Uroš IV Dušan, Dušan the Mighty, King of Serbia, 1331-1346 and self-proclaimed Emperor of 
the Serbs, Bulgars, Romanians, Greeks, and Albanians, (1346-1355).27 Incidentally, Dušan came 
into a conflict with the Church and was never canonized. After the Great migration of Serbs in 
1690, the patriarchate relocated from Kosovo to northwestern Balkans under Austrian Habsburg 
authority. If Serbia could have two national “cradles” or founding centers that could be only the 
earlier described St. Sava’s medieval state versus modern Serbia. Modern Serbia was created at 
the new church seat at Sremski Karlovci (in the present-day Vojvodina), relocated to the new 
political capital of Belgrade when Serbia became an independent state recognized and expanded 
at the Congress of Berlin 1878. In the nineteenth century, the Serbian state revived in official 
patriotic rituals and through schooling, the mythical narrative about the 1389 battle at the 
Kosovo Filed and the downfall of the empire. The narrative about the Kosovo battle and the 
lamentations over the lost empire have been since commemorated on state and church holiday—
Vidovdan or Saint Vitus Day. Out of these commemorations rose a nation building ideology 
seeking expansion and restoration of the size and power of the medieval empire.  
 There are several references to Jerusalem as the Christian Holy City and Holy Land (in 
the Middle East) in Serbian folklore and history. Yet none of these references could be taken as 
the precursor to the contemporary meanings and connotations of the phrase “Serbian Jerusalem” 
referring to Kosovo. First, there is a mention of Jerusalem in the epic narrative about the 1389 
Kosovo battle to suggest that the heroic Prince Lazar received a divine message from the Holy 
 
27 On the eve of the 1346 coronation, Dušan raised the Serbian archbishopric to the status of a patriarchate, the 
highest religious authority in Eastern Orthodox Christianity. The new patriarchate moved to Peć, town in 
western Kosovo, (Pejë, formerly Ipek). The Archbishop of Peć was titled Serbian Patriarch, and his seat 
at Monastery of Peć became Patriarchal residence. Under Otoman rule, when Serbia virtually ceased to exist as a 
state, the patriarchate at Peć was recognized by Turkish authorities as an authority representing not only Serbs but 
all Christians in that part of empire. 
 
OCCASIONAL PAPERS ON RELIGION IN EASTERN EUROPE (DECEMBER 2017) XXXVII, 6 36
Land. 28 Second, as mentioned earlier, there is the chapel and pilgrim’s guesthouse that St. Sava 
had built in Jerusalem for Serb pilgrims and therefore a “Serbian Jerusalem” (in the Middle East, 
not in Kosovo). Third, there is the expression of a “Serb Golgotha.” Church leaders sometimes 
described the Kosovo battle in which most of the Serb nobility perished, and the subsequent life 
under Muslim rule as a “Serbian Golgotha.”29 A similar phrase, namely, “the Albanian 
Golgotha,” emerged out of the First World War. The Serbian army suffered heavy casualties as it 
retreated to Greece across the Albanian mountains.30 Commemorating the First World War as 
martyrdom and heroism of the Serbs comparable to the Kosovo battle, Patriarch Dimitrije 
Pavlović in 1918 used the phrase “Serbian Jerusalem” referring to the island Corfu in Greece 
where the Serbian army retreated during the war and recuperated for the liberation of Serbia. The 
Patriarch urged Serbs for holy journeys to the isle with memorials and military graveyard, like 
pilgrims go to Jerusalem. 31 
 After the First Balkan War of 1912 when Serbia militarily acquired Kosovo, the Serbian 
state for the first time in history presented Kosovo to the world as a holy land of the Serbs in 
order to legitimize military conquest. Church historian Dimitrije Bogdanović (in a book 
published in the 1980s), argues that the idea of Kosovo as a holy land of the Serbs claimed by 
Serbia before the world powers, was articulated after three Balkan wars in 1912-1913. The 1913 
 
28 There is mentioning of Jerusalem in the Kosovo epic according to the following verses: “There flies, a grey bird, a 
falcon, From Jerusalem, the holy; And in his beak, he bears a swallow. That is no falcon, no grey bird; But it is the 
Saint Elijah. He carries no swallow; But a book from the Mother of God. He comes to the Tsar at Kossovo, He lays 
the book on the Tsar’s knees . . .” Quoted from Rebecca West, Black Lamb and Grey Falcon. A Journey through 
Yugoslavia, Introduction by Christopher Hitchens. (New York: Penguin Books, 2007), pp. 909-911. 
29 Thomas A. Emmert, Serbian Golgotha: Kosovo, 1389. (Boulder: East European Monographs, New York: 
Distributed by Columbia University Press, 1990). 
30 Ljubinka Trgovčević, “The Kosovo Myth in the First World War,” in Ilija Konev, Sveti mesta na Balkanite. 
(Blagoevgrad, Bulgaria: UNESCO, 1996, pp. 331–338); John Reed, “The War in Eastern Europe,” in The Collected 
Works of John Reed. (New York: Modern Library, 1995), pp. 54-55. 
31 “The real Serbian Jerusalem are the isles of Corfu and Vido,” according to Dragiša Drašković,“Srpski Jerusalim 
su Vido i Krf,” in the Serbian daily Blic online 14. 06. 2009, http://www.blic.rs/vesti/reportaza/srpski-jerusalim-su-
vido-i-krf/1lnxc4f. 
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international conference in London, seeking settlement for the post-war Balkans, heard the 
following claims based on the historic and cultural rights of the Serbian ethnic minority in 
Kosovo against the Albanian ethnic majority: 
 It was rightly said (in the Serbian Memorandum to the ambassadors of the European 
 Powers in London in 1913) that this territory is a kind of "Holy Land" for the Serbian 
 people… In the negotiations about territories and borders in Kosovo and Metohija at the 
 1913 conference in London, Serbia prioritized the historic, ethnographic, cultural and 
 moral criteria. These include the continuity of the Serb statehood and culture in Kosovo. 
 Therefore, Serbia emphasizes that the land on which stand the historic monasteries and 
 shrines such as the Patriarchate of Peć, the Dečani monastery and the Orthodox cathedral 
 at Đakovica, have always been a holy land for all Serbs. Hence, no Serb or Montenegrin 
 government would cede the holy land of the Serbs to the Albanians or anyone else. On 
 that point, the Serbian people will not make any concessions, transactions or compromise 
 …”32  
 
 Yet, the London conference was by no means fascinated with the Serb sacred heritage 
and the mythical history in Kosovo, as Bogdanović implies. Neither did the Western powers take 
seriously the historic and cultural rights of the Serbs in Kosovo to endorse the annexation of 
Kosovo by Serbia. On the contrary, the world powers pursued Realpolitik by recognizing fait 
accompli established by Serbia’s military occupation of Kosovo. Concurrently, the London 
Conference (i.e. Britain and France), took into consideration Albanian nationalism and the 
Albanian ethnic majority in the neighboring parts of the Balkans, to recognize a newly 
established Albanian national state, the Kingdom of Albania. 
 The first published verbatim quote of the phrase “Serbian Jerusalem” referring to Kosovo 
as a holy land of the Serbs, is most likely a 1939 newspaper article by general Milan Nedić, the 
World War I hero and later the chief pro-Nazi collaborator presiding over a puppet regime in 
occupied Serbia. In June 1939, on the occasion of the 550th anniversary of the Kosovo battle, 
General Nedić wrote an article in the daily Politika about the Kosovo legacy as inspiration for 
 
32 Dimitrije Bogdanović, Book about Kosovo (Knjiga o Kosovu). (Beograd: Srpska akademija nauka i umetnosti, 
1986),  p. 34. 
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the present. Nedić hoped for a massive resistance to the impending Nazi invasion, so he urged 
Serbs to invoke the example of the hero Miloš Obilić, the sultan’s assassin amidst the Kosovo 
battle. According to Nedić, “today, as dark clouds gather in the skies of Europe, we Serbs are yet 
again returning to Kosovo, Serbian Jerusalem, and the eternal fountain of our vital stamina, to 
smell the red flowers on the heroes’ graves and inhale the fighting spirt of Obilić.”33 Nedić was 
no nationalist poet or writer; he was a military leader and he did not himself invent the “Serbian 
Jerusalem” metaphor. He probably borrowed it from sermons and speeches of the then 
increasingly influential religious nationalist and leading Serb theologian, later canonized saint of 
the Serbian Orthodox Church, Bishop of Žića, Nikolaj Velimirović. 
 To summarize, “Serbian Jerusalem” exemplifies the nationalist practice of the invention 
of tradition. The contemporary Serbian nationalist movement, focusing on the struggle for 
Kosovo as seeking weapons in history, religion, and tradition, presented Kosovo as a “cradle” of 
the nation and the original sacred center where medieval Serbian state was founded. Present-day 
Serb nationalism intentionally disregarded or “forgot” the primacy of the historic center of the 
medieval Serbian state which was outside Kosovo, and dwarfed the unquestionably major Serb 
saintly cult of Saint Sava, worshiped as the Church’s founder, the state’s co-founder and the 
religious mystic, Christian pilgrim, diplomat, and peacemaker. By contrast, contemporary 
nationalism, planning for mass mobilization, war, and the replacement of Yugoslavia by a 
Greater Serbia, prioritized the memory of the medieval empire, the militant saint Prince Lazar 
and the avenger of Kosovo, sultan’s assassin Milos Obilić.  
 In addition to the invention of tradition, the contemporary Serbian nationalist movement 
operating within a globalizing world, espoused new religious practices such as notably religious 
 
33 Quoted from Ivan Čolović, Death on the Kosovo Field, p.317. General Milan Nedić (1877-1946), was sentenced 
to death as a Nazi collaborator and executed by the federal government of the People’s Republic of Yugoslavia. 
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nationalism. According to Roger Friedland, religious nationalism is “a set of discursive practices 
by which the territorial identity of a state and the cultural identity of the people whose collective 
representation it claims are constituted as a singular fact.”34 Religious nationalism calls for a new 
theocracy. It is an anti-liberal and anti-secular ideology influential since the 1970s that rejects the 
modern secular type of nationhood as a de-secularized community organizing state and territory 
according to religion and myth. Thus, according to Peter van der Veer’s research on contesting 
territorial claims and religious monuments in northern India, “sacred sites are the physical 
evidence of the perennial existence of the religious community and, by nationalist expansion, of 
the nation. … The history of shrines, as told in religious tales, and established by archeological 
evidence, is the history of the nation.”35 In the Balkans, religious nationalism, Dino Abazović 
explains, following the destruction of multiethnic Yugoslavia, assisted the formation of an ethno-
confessional type of nationality and based on this service, wants to influence politics to decide on 
the model of statehood and nationhood particularly opposing ethnoreligious pluralism and 
secularism.36  
 In sum, Kosovo is not Serbia’s “cradle” but it symbolizes Serbia’s pre-modern “golden 
age.” The discourse about the “cradle” of the state that integrated the people and paved the way 
to nationhood combines two archetype nationalist myths: myth of ancient origins, and myth of 
rise and fall. According to Pål Kolstø’s 2005 study on ethnic nationalist myths in the Balkans, 
the key nationalist myths of the Balkan ethnic nations are the myth of antiquity (ancient origins, 
deep historic roots of the nation), and the myth of golden age (the state’s rise and expansion and 
 
34 Roger Firedland, “Religious Nationalism and the Problem of Collective Representation,” Annual Review of 
Sociology, 27, 2001, pp. 125-152. See also Rogers Brubaker, “Religion and Nationalism: Four Approaches,” 
Nations and Nationalism, 18 (1): 2-20, January 2012, p.17. 
35 Peter Van Der Veer, Religious Nationalism: Hindus and Muslims in India. (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1994), p. 214. 
36 Dino Abazović, For the Nation and for God: A Sociological Explanation of Religious Nationalism (Za naciju i 
boga: Sociolosko odredenje religijskog nacionalizma). (Sarajevo: Magistrat, 2006), p. 107. 
 
OCCASIONAL PAPERS ON RELIGION IN EASTERN EUROPE (DECEMBER 2017) XXXVII, 6 40
if applicable, collapse and commemoration).37 The recent nationalist discourse needed both 
constitutive nationalist myths, namely the myth of the nation’s “cradle” (ancient origins) and of 
the golden age of its expansion and glory followed by a tragic yet not forgotten downfall, for 
contemporary purposes of mass mobilization aimed at reframing collective identity and restoring 
the past glory preferably within the boundaries of the medieval empire. The invention of 
tradition and the material evidence of the sacred heritage and religious symbols from the nation’s 
golden age, have overall served well the purpose of the Serb mass mobilization for the 
destruction of multiethnic Yugoslavia. Regarding the restoration of the empire (in contemporary 
parlance called Greater Serbia), the results have been less successful. The Serb republic in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina seems as the only palpable gain. Croatia emerged from the 1991-1995 Serb-
Croat war militarily strong and furiously anti-Serbian with its Serb minority largely “cleansed.” 
Kosovo eventually seceded from Serbia and the local Serbs have been largely “cleansed.” 
Although the sacred monuments are still there as reminders of the bygone empire and the 
enduring Serbia’s imperial ambitions, they could not prove that Serbs “got there first.” On the 
contrary, according to a number of impartial studies, the Albanians are presumably the 
indigenous residents of the Balkans, sometimes linked to the ancient Illyrians, whose ethnic 
name South Slavic nationalist movements had appropriated, settling in Kosovo and present-day 
Albania long before the Slavic migrations of the seventh to ninth centuries.38 However, the actual 
history is only one dimension of the Kosovo controversy. The Kosovo myth, as part of a 
“religion of Serbian nationalism” as Ivan Čolović describes it, have since the nineteenth century 
when Serbian secular and clerical elites began using it for state and nation-building, become an 
 
37 Pål Kolstø, ed., Myths and Boundaries in South-Eastern Europe, (London: Hurst. & Company, 2005), pp. 19-21. 
38 Noel Malcolm, Kosovo: a Short History, (New York: Harper Perennial, 1999); Tim Judah, Kosovo: What 
Everyone Needs to Know, (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2008). 
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autonomous socio-cultural phenomenon creating representations of the past or present that often 
contradict reality.39  
 
3.  Beyond the Holy Land: Inventing a Serbia-Israel Special Relationship  
 The Serbian nationalist movement destabilizing Yugoslavia in the 1980s anticipated 
ethnic cleansing of Kosovo and subsequent all-Serb re-colonization of the “holy land.” In 
preparation, Belgrade media and nationalist leaders accused the majority Albanians of no less 
than genocide. It has been allegedly carried out by terror and expulsion of the Serb minority in 
order to create an ethnically homogenous Kosovo to eventually unite with Albania. Actually, 
Albanian nationalism did not have such an agenda at the time, but today it does have, as the 
consequence of the Serb assault. According to Belgrade propaganda, Albanians, mostly Muslims 
by religion, hate Serbs as Christians who defended Kosovo from the Muslim conquest since the 
mythical fourteenth century battle. The Albanians also allegedly envy Serbs on the well- 
preserved historic monuments, churches, and holy relics as powerful material evidence 
supporting territorial claims. The Serb nationalist movement of the 1980s created a state of siege 
in the minds of the Serbs, allegedly threatened by growing genocidal nationalisms in the 
neighboring peoples. In addition to the Albanian threat, Belgrade media and nationalist hawks 
alleged, an awakened Croat nationalism aimed at finishing the genocide against Serbs begun in 
World War II, while Bosnian Muslims, influenced by Islamic radicalism, wanted an Islamic state 
in Muslim-populated areas of the Balkans. To make the growing Serb fears worse, Croats and 
Bosnian Muslim national political, cultural, and religious institutions never explicitly condemned 
those legacies. As the Yugoslav communist control eroded, the renewed historical controversies 
 
39 Ivan Čolović, Death at the Kosovo Field, pp. 459-461. 
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pressured the quarrelling ethnic communities.40 The Croat pro-Axis regime in the Second World 
War indeed carried out a mass persecution of the Serb and Jewish minorities in Croatia and 
Bosnia-Herzegovina and a revisionist nationalist denial rose within Croat nationalism responding 
to the pressure from Serbia.41  
 The Serbian Orthodox Church, as national institution that pioneered the contemporary 
Serbian nationalist movement as early as the 1960s,42 contributed to the movement’s momentum 
in the 1980s. The Church released two major publications covering the Kosovo theme and the 
theme of genocide against Serbs in the Second World War, particularly at the concentration 
camp Jasenovac in northern Croatia. In 1987, an illustrated encyclopedia cataloged several 
hundred historic monuments, archeological sites, graveyards, medieval churches, and the 
provinces of Kosovo and Metohija.43 The editors presented the monuments as invaluable yet 
unprotected Serb heritage that the Albanian enemy aims to destroy. Again, Albanian nationalism 
back then did not have such plans but it does have these plans today. Regarding the Croat 
genocide theme, from 1986-1990, the Holy Synod of the Serbian Orthodox Church released 
several publications about Croat fascist Ustasha movement’s concentration camps.44 The theme 
 
40 See Tea Sindbaek, Usable History: Representations of Yugoslavia’s Difficult Past from 1945 to 2002, (Aarhus, 
Denmark: Aarhus University Press, 2012). 
41 In spite of a massive propaganda, there is also voluminous multilingual objective scholarship on ethnic massacres 
and genocide during the Second World War in the Balkans. See the following : Ivo Goldstein and Slavko Goldstein, 
The Holocaust in Croatia, (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, published in association with the United 
States Holocaust Memorial Museum, 2016); Slavko Goldstein, 1941: The Year that Keeps Returning, introduction 
by Charles Simić, translated from the Croatian by Michael Gable, (New York: The New York Review of Books, 
2013); Jozo Tomasevich, War and Revolution in Yugoslavia, 1941-1945. Occupation and Collaboration, (Stanford, 
CA: Stanford University Press, 2001); Paul Mojzes, Balkan Genocides: Holocaust and Ethnic Cleansing in the 
Twentieth Century, (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2011); Anton Weiss-Wendt, ed., Eradicating Differences: 
the Treatment of Minorities in Nazi-dominated Europe, (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars, 2010); Lisa M. 
Adeli, with a preface by Frederick Kellogg, Resistance to the Persecution of Ethnic Minorities in Croatia and 
Bosnia during World War II,(Lewiston, N.Y.: Edwin Mellen Press, 2009).  
42 Vjekoslav Perica, Balkan Idols, chapters 3, 8 and 9. 
43 Atanasije Jevtić et al., eds., Sacred Endowments of Kosovo: Monuments and symbols of the Serbian People 
(Zadužbine Kosova: spomenici i znamenja srpskog naroda), (Belgrade: Eparhija Raško-Prizrenska i Bogoslovski 
fakultet, 1987), pp. 831–842. 
44 Eternal Memory - Jasenovac, the Place Soaked in the Blood of Innocents, with summaries in English, on the 
fiftieth anniversary of Martyred Jesenovac and of the seventh anniversary of the Consecration of the new Church of 
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was neither forbidden nor neglected under communism; yet, the new Serb nationalism offered 
reinterpretations from the vantage point of the earlier suppressed ethnoreligious nationalism. 
Now the newly discovered chief motive for the Croat Ustasha genocide was not the influence of 
the Nazi-fascist ideology and proven Ustasha’s ties with Mussolini and Hitler, but the incitement 
from the Vatican as the historic nemesis of the independent-minded Serbian Orthodox Church 
which the Vatican allegedly attempted to convert into a Uniate Church.45 The inventor of this 
thesis was the Bishop Nikolaj Velimirović, later canonized saint of the Serbian Orthodox 
Church. As an émigré anti-Yugoslav activist in the United States, Velimirović in the 1950s spoke 
and wrote about Ustasha genocide in the Second World War. He explained it as the crime 
motivated by religious hatred and envy between the two fraternal peoples, as in the biblical story 
of Cain and Abel—the Orthodox Serbs likened to the latter and the Catholic Croats to the 
former.46 Velimirović concluded that Croats, because of the communist atheistic rule and the 
influence of Ustashas in their ranks, have never properly repented. Hence he proposed a Temple 
of Atonement to be built at the Jasenovac concentration camp memorial site as a place for 
interfaith pilgrimages after the fall of communism and reconciliation of the Churches (provided 
the Catholics repented). Yet, in consequence of the Serb-Croat war of 1991-1995, post-war 
Serbia and Croatia wrote new histories that cemented the conflict. 
 A prominent contributor to the new discourse of Serbian nationalism was, among others, 
Enriko Josif, a Yugoslav intellectual of Jewish background and co-chairman of the national 
Jewish Association. Josif, an anti-Catholic, blaming the Vatican for not opposing the Holocaust, 
had introduced in public discourse a parallel between the Jasenovac concentration camp and 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
the Nativity of St. John the Baptist - Memorial Church Jasenovac, (Belgrade: Holy Synod of the Serbian Orthodox 
Church, 1990). 
45 See the details in Balkan Idols, chapter 9. 
46 Ibid. 
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Auschwitz.47 The Serbian Orthodox Church utilized his ideas such as the following: “One of the 
horrible spiritual crimes is the fact that what happened to the Serbs was hushed up in the whole 
world. This is a postwar continuation of the horrible crime … The worst service to the West, and 
particularly to the Roman Catholic Church of the Croats, was to hush up the religious and 
biological crime of genocide committed against the Serbian people during World War II. In the 
name of Christ and Christian love, the head of the Roman Catholic Church should have raised 
his voice and condemned the eternal sin of Cain. This should be done as soon as possible.”48 
 Serbian secular and clerical nationalists further developed the Serb-Jewish parallel. A 
version of the Serbo-Jewish parallel came from Serb Orthodox priest , Žarko Gavrilović: “the 
Serbs are the greatest martyrs of humankind …,” because, “no other people in the world, except 
the Jews, have suffered so much for their faith and nation …49 Writer Dobrica Ćosić, a former 
Yugoslav communist who broke up with the party over the Kosovo controversy, as an emerging 
chief ideologue of contemporary Serbian nationalism, stated in a 1983 interview, “the Serb is the 
new Jew at the end of the twentieth century.”50 Ćosić claims to be the first to propose a territorial 
partition of Kosovo between Serbia and Albania. In one of his last interviews before his death in 
2014, he argued that he had been proposing the partition of Kosovo between Serbia and Albania 
for more than four decades but nobody took it seriously.51 According to another source, Ćosić 
published a blueprint for partition of Kosovo as early as 1994 in the Italian journal for 
 
47 See for example, Vladimir Dedijer, Yugoslav Auschwitz and the Vatican: The Croatian Massacre of the Serbs 
During World War Two, documents selected and compiled by Vladimir Dedijer, translated by Harvey L. Kendall, 
(Buffalo, NY: Prometheus Books, 1992). 
48 Quoted in Balkan Idols, pp.124-125. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Quoted in Balkan Idols, p.124. 
51 “Ćosić: Partition of Kosovo is the Only Solution” (Ćosić: Podela Kosova jedino rešenje”), Belgrade, 
BETA,29.05.2011, http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2011&mm=05&dd=29&nav_id=515183. 
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geopolitics, “Limes.”52 Subsequently, Serbian nationalist leaders proposed to the Alabamians and 
the international community, several plans for partitioning Kosovo.53 
 History since the emergence of those partition plans, as well as earlier analogous 
experiences, has shown that territorial settlements in the Balkans never worked out without war 
and ethnic cleansing. Dobrica Ćosić was by no means the only one among Balkan ethnic 
nationalist to consider partitions. Two other prominent nationalist separatist leaders such Bosnian 
Muslim lawyer Alija Izetbegović and Croat historian Franjo Tudjman developed similar plans 
from the perspectives of their respective ethno-confessional communities. As early as 1970, 
Izetbegović secretly published (and was later jailed for that by a Yugoslav court) a blueprint for 
partition of Yugoslavia proposing the model of the partition between India and Pakistan.54 The 
historian Tudjman published in 1981 a paper predicting fragmentation of a number of European 
nation-states into smaller ethnically homogenous units, which he considered “natural” and all 
other types of nationhood artificial.55 Tudjman predicted triumphant separatist movements and 
partitions not only in the Balkans but also in Western Europe. In his subsequent works on 
genocide, Tudjman even drew analogies between Serbian and Israeli nationalism to argue that 
Serbs and Jews invented myths about their nations’ collective suffering and persecution in which 
they magnified the actual number of victims. In a revised U.S. edition of this book, Tudjman, 
then president of Croatia, softened these allegations in order to improve Croatia’s international 
reputation as a newly founded nation.56 
 
52 “Partition of Kosovo is the Ultimate Goal of Serbia” (“Podela Kosova krajnji cilj Srbije”), Blic online, Belgrade, 
01.10. 2008. 
53 Nexhmedin Spahiu, “Serb Proposals for Partitioning Kosova,” Central Europe Review, Vol 1, No 1, 28.06.1999. 
54 Alija Izetbegović, The Islamic Declaration (Islamska deklaracija), Sarajevo: Bosna, 1990. 
55 Franjo Tudjman, Nationalism in Contemporary Europe, (Boulder: East European Monographs, New York: 
distributed by Columbia University Press, 1981). 
56 Franjo Tudjman, Horrors of War: Historical Reality and Philosophy, translated from Croatian by Katarina 
Mijatović, revised edition, (New York: M. Evans, 1996). 
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 Arguably, the year 1985 was the moment of the invention of the idea of “Serbian 
Jerusalem” as the parallel between Kosovo and Israel behind which unfolds the Serb-Jewish 
special relationship as two martyr-nations persecuted by Nazis and Muslims in the past and 
present. The inventor of this “Serbian Jerusalem” is the writer Vuk Drašković a former 
communist-turned ethnic nationalist. Like Dobrica Ćosić or Slobodan Milošević, Drašković used 
to be a senior Yugoslav communist official deserting the party for allegedly not protecting Serb 
national rights within the federation. In 1985, Drašković published an open letter to Israeli 
writers outlining a new history according to which Serbs and Jews have suffered and were hated 
and martyred as independent-minded, being faithful to their identity, religion, and tradition. 
According to Drašković, Serbs are the thirteenth lost and the most ill-fated tribe of Israel; the 
archeological traces of the ancient Serb and Jewish kingdoms can be found in the two holy lands 
of Kosovo and Israel-Palestine; Kosovo is therefore “Serbian Jerusalem.” The five centuries of 
Serb stateless life under Muslim Ottoman Turkish rule Drašković describes as “the Babylonian 
Captivity,” and the Great Migration of Serbs from Kosovo as the biblical Exodus, etc. Drašković 
also informed Israeli writers that Yugoslav Jews and Serbs shared the same fate in World War II 
as victims of genocide carried out by Croat and Bosnian Muslim pro-Nazi and fascist ethnic 
militia. Drašković implies that Serbs and Jews have the same common enemies today as they had 
in the Second World War and must help each other.57 Twenty years later, appearing on a 
television show in the Bosnian Serb republic, Drašković claimed that in the 1980s he had 
invented “that Serbian Jerusalem metaphor.”58 
 
57 See Marko Zivkovic, “The Wish to be a Jew: The Power of the Jewish Trope in the Yugoslav Conflict,” Cahiers 
de l’Urmis [Online], 06.03.2000, http://urmis.revues.org/323. 
58 According to Drašković’s statement on talk show “Ćirilica” (“The Cyrillic Alphabet”), on BN television, 1 April 
2013, retrieved on 14 July 2015, on youtube link: https://youtu.be/erOEKnnEdl8. 
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 In his letter, Drašković reinterpreted history borrowing from the past whatever he could 
use in the present. He, for example, omitted to inform the Israeli public opinion that a wartime 
Serbian pro-Nazi puppet regime under General Nedić and the native Serb fascist Dimitrije Ljotić, 
helped the Nazi occupiers annihilate Serbia’s Jewish population. Actually, Drašković led a 
political party that proposed rehabilitation of Nedić as a hero of anti-communist struggle. In 
addition, Drašković probably borrowed the “Serbian Jerusalem” phrase referring to Kosovo from 
Nedić’s 1939 article published in the Belgrade daily “Politika” while the original inventor is 
most likely the religious nationalist Bishop Velimirović, yet another Drašković’s hero.59  
 The nationalist media in Serbia, borrowed and expanded Drašković’s metaphors and 
parallels, such as the following 1986 article: “The Jews … people who have been for nearly 2000 
years denied by European states to serve in the military and choose military professions, have 
today one of the best organized and best armed, also perfectly trained and best combat-ready 
military forces in the world. The Israeli army’s superiority has been successfully tested in wars 
they won against far more numerous enemy armies. This is what kind of military force Serbia 
needs today in order to protect Kosovo Serbs and Orthodox Christian shrines from the Muslim 
threat …”60 In short, by the outbreak of the Balkan wars of the 1990s, the Serbian Jerusalem and 
Serbia-Israel parallels have become additions to the new discourse of contemporary Serbian 
nationalism. 
 Students of Serbian nationalism observed the impact of the “Serbian Jerusalem” idea and 
the comparisons between Serbs and Jews. Analyzing these narratives in the context of the 
disintegration of Yugoslavia and the Balkan wars of the 1990s, political scientist Jasna Dragović-
 
59 Quoted in Čolović, Death on the Kosovo Field, p.317. 
60 Mirko Klarin and Raul Tajtelbaum, Israel in a Verbal Civil War (Izrael u verbalnom građanskom ratu), (Beograd, 
1986), pp. 10. Quoted according to Vladimir Veljković, “Kosovo is a Serbian Jerusalem” (Kosovo je srpski 
Jerusalim,” Peščanik, 28.11.2015, http://pescanik.net/kosovo-je-srpski-jerusalim/. 
OCCASIONAL PAPERS ON RELIGION IN EASTERN EUROPE (DECEMBER 2017) XXXVII, 6 48
Soso noted that, “Kosovo allowed the Serb nationalist intelligentsia” … “to adopt the role of 
guardians of both national and universal values—the vision of Kosovo as the ‘Serbian 
Jerusalem’, a holy land of an inestimable importance to national identity.”61 Similarly, social 
anthropologist Marko Živković wrote: “The ‘Jewish trope’ … was one of the most important of 
…the elements of Serbian national narratives, especially in linking the central Serbian myth of 
Kosovo to the more recent cycle of narratives that focus on the Ustasha genocide against Serbs 
during the Second World War.”62  
 The discourses on Serbian Jerusalem and the Serb-Jewish comparisons reached a 
pinnacle during the Serbo-Albanian war in Kosovo (1998-1999) and the NATO bombing of 
Serbia in spring of 1999. Under the nationalist Slobodan Milošević (1987-2001), a Belgrade-
based organization named “Serb-Jewish Friendship Society” served as the regime’s lobbying 
tool in Israel and the United States. Founded in 1987—the year when Milošević took power, and 
controlled by Milošević’s secret police, the society mobilized several thousand members in 
Serbia, Israel, and the United States. Klara Mandić, a retired Belgrade dentist and Holocaust 
survivor, served as the society’s president and chief spokesperson. Joining the vehement 
campaign against Marshal Tito’s legacies in Serbia, the society attacked the pro-Palestinian 
course as one of hallmarks of Tito’s foreign policy urging Milošević’s Yugoslavia and Serbia to 
upgrade relations with Israel. The society appropriated the Serbian Jerusalem discourse using it 
to defend the Serb territorial claims and Milošević’s repressive policies in Kosovo. During the 
Serb-Albanian war of 1998-1999 in Kosovo and the NATO bombing of Serbia, a society’s 
American representative addressed Jewish-American audience with the following ideas: 
 
61 Jasna Dragović-Soso, Saviors of the Nation? Serbia's Intellectual Opposition and the Revival of Nationalism, 
(London: Hurst & Co., 2002). 
62 According to Zivkovic, “The Wish to be a Jew.” 
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As you know, Serbs compare Kosovo to Jerusalem. Yet, to the Serbs, Kosovo means 
even more than Jerusalem to the Jews. Kosovo is also the Serb Masada. There was a 
battle at Kosovo in 1389, the Serbian kingdom’s last stand against the Ottoman Empire in 
which many thousands of Serbs—every Serbian soldier in the battle—were killed. In 
many ways … the Balkans are like the Middle East, when neighbor is fighting neighbor. 
A common saying there is, "It’s me against my cousin, and my cousin and me against the 
world.63 
 
 The Serb-Jewish Friendship Society shared the fate of the Milošević regime. After 
Milošević’s fall and arrest by the Hague war crimes tribunal, Mandić was murdered in 2001 in 
Belgrade under mysterious circumstances. However, the small Serbia’s Jewish community was 
not the same as the Serb-Jewish Friendship society. Actually, most Yugoslav intellectuals of 
Jewish origin openly backed Serbia’s resistance against Milošević. For example, internationally 
acclaimed authors Danilo Kiš, Filip David, and Oskar Davičo, among others, contributed with 
statements and writings to the anti-Milošević opposition in Serbia.64 Likewise, the Yugoslav 
sociologist of Jewish origin, Laslo Sekelj argued that the Milošević regime was essentially anti-
Semitic insofar as its supporters involved a number of outspoken anti-Semitic right-wing 
nationalist and racist groups including the zealots of the Serbian Orthodox Church.65 
 Israeli public opinion followed and occasionally commented on the parallels and ideas 
coming to the Middle East from the Balkans. Some Israeli circles showed sympathies to the Serb 
cause in the Balkan wars of the 1990s, yet, the State of Israel supported the United States that 
found Serbia chiefly responsible for the war and massive human right violations in the Balkans. 
Regarding the Arab population in Israel, they supported Bosnian Muslims and condemned the 
Serb atrocities in Bosnia-Herzegovina. For example, during the Bosnian war, Israeli government 
 
63 “Another side to the story of Kosovo,” by Pauline Dubkin Yearwood, Jewish World Review, 19.04.1999, 
http://www.jewishworldreview.com/0499/serb.jews1.asp. 
64 See Eric Gordy, The Culture of Power in Serbia: Nationalism and the Destruction of Alternatives, (College Park: 
Penn State University Press, 1999). 
65 Laslo Sekelj, Antisemitism and Jewish Identity in Serbia after the 1991 Collapse of the Yugoslav State, 
(Jerusalem: The Vidal Sassoon International Center for the Study of Antisemitism, 1997). 
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came under pressure from its Muslim population to accept Bosnian Muslim refugees. 
Consequently, a group of Bosnian Muslim refugees found shelter in Israel, including a later 
popular Balkan hip-hop artist Edo Maajka.66 
 However, as U.S. Balkan policies paved the way to Kosovo’s secession from Serbia and 
an independent Albanian republic, Israel supported Serbia’s effort to block Kosovo’s statehood. 
In Israeli perspective, the Kosovo secession would encourage Palestinian Arab separatism in 
Israel. In 2006, the writer Vuk Drašković, now serving as Serbia’s foreign minister, visited 
Jerusalem and managed to obtain Israeli promises not to recognize independent Kosovo. In 
Israel, Drašković received a warm welcome. According to the Jerusalem Post, “Drašković as 
Serbia’s foreign minister (described Kosovo) as the ‘Serbian Jerusalem’ because of its central 
place in Serbian history and religious tradition. Drašković said the parallels between the 
experiences and treatment of Israel and Serbia by the international community should draw the 
two countries together. Drašković … will be visiting Jerusalem's Old City, Nazareth and Galilee 
… will meet with representatives of the Orthodox Church but not Palestinian officials.”67    
 With proclamation of Kosovo independence nearing, an Israeli journal called for caution 
warning about foreign policy precedents that might apply to the Palestinian Arabs’ long quest for 
statehood: The so-called "Serbian Jerusalem": Kosovo is not just a part of Serbia but also "the 
cradle of its nationalism and culture." If the "Serbian Jerusalem" is taken away from it, why 
should "Al Quds" not be taken from us in the future and become the capital of the independent 
 
66 According to the New York Times, “Arabs in Israel and in other parts of the Middle East have been castigating 
foreign governments for not aiding Muslim refugees from Bosnia. Mayors of Arab villages here at first welcomed 
the Israeli decision to accept a group of Bosnians, but some later reversed themselves, apparently under pressure 
from the Palestine Liberation Organization and other Arab groups … We have reached the conclusion that this is an 
operation aimed at improving Israel's image, which has been tarnished by the Palestinian deportations,” said Ahmed 
Tibi, spokesman for a committee of Arabs who were initially planning to help settle the refugees in Arab 
communities.” Stephen Kinzer, “Israel Accepts 84 of Bosnia's Muslim Refugees,” The New York Times, 18.02. 
1993, at http://www.nytimes.com/1993/02/18/world/israel-accepts-84-of-bosnia-s-muslim-refugees.html. 
67 The Jerusalem Post, 5. 11. 2006. 
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Palestine? The danger of Islam: The establishment of Kosovo will award a prize to a violent 
ethnic-religious minority, whose leaders have ties to the Mafia and to the global jihad. 
Recognizing them will increase Islamic influence and will strengthen anti-Semitic and anti-
Israeli opinions in Europe. …The Kosovar analogy does not resemble the Israeli-Palestinian 
situation Jews (or at least some of them) are willing to compromise in Jerusalem whereas the 
Serbs are refusing to relinquish "their heart and soul.” “Today Serbia—tomorrow Israel: Israel 
must oppose the perception whereby a political and territorial conflict can be ended by means of 
an external, imposed solution and without the support of both sides to the conflict. If not, who 
will guarantee that in the future Israel will not have a solution with the Palestinians imposed 
upon it?68  
 Since 2008, Kosovo has become an independent state recognized by several dozen 
nations yet not by Israel and countries fearing separatist nationalist movements (e.g. Spain). 
Kosovo Albanians tried to emulate the Serb tactics of wooing Israel using the motive of common 
suffering. In 2013, Kosovo Albanian politician and former Prime Minister Enver Hoxhaj visited 
Jerusalem in a hope to convince Israel to recognize Kosovo as a sovereign nation. The Jerusalem 
Post reports, that according to Hoxhaj “there are some similarities between Kosovo and Jews in 
terms of their suffering,” yet the journal concludes,” despite Kosovo’s open admiration for Israel, 
Palestinian unilateralism and ties with Russia make recognition of the Balkan state difficult for 
Jerusalem.”69  
 
68 “Kosovo in Israeli eyes,” Haaretz, 19.12.2007, at www.haaretz.com. 
69 “Israel-Kosovo Relations Marked by Shared Sympathies, Hampered by Identity Politics,” The Jerusalem Post, 27. 
02. 2015. 
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 A number of Israeli scholars and Western researchers of Israel and Jewish issues have 
noticed the manipulation with the Holocaust and the uses of the Jews in the Balkan conflict.70 
Concurrently, the Simon Wiesenthal Center maintained a special focus on the Balkans reporting 
on anti-Semitism, historical revisionism, and right-wing nationalist extremism in all former 
Yugoslav states.71 Israeli scholars showed particular interest in the neo-fascist tendencies in post-
Yugoslav Croatia and in the new radical Islamism in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Simon 
Wiesenthal Center noticed Croat government’s tolerance of neo-fascism and anti-Semitism.72 
Israel and several EU countries filed protests with the Croatian government after numerous anti-
Semitic public statements and denials of the Holocaust. In April 2016, the United States 
dispatched to Croatia Ambassador Nicholas Dean, the State Department’s special envoy for 
Holocaust issues who pressured Croatia’s president Kolinda Grabar-Kitarović to make a 
television appearance condemning Croat Ustasha crimes in World War II and calling for a better 
education about the Holocaust in Croatia.73 When the 2015, a right-wing Croatian party returned 
to power, Ephraim Zuroff, historian and Wiesenthal Center’s representative in Eastern Europe 
wrote about “the return of evil in Croat history.”74 The World Jewish Congress announced an 
 
70 David Bruce Macdonald, Balkan Holocausts? Serbian and Croatian Victim-Centered Propaganda and the War in 
Yugoslavia, (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 2003); David MacDonald, “Globalizing the Holocaust: 
A Jewish ‘useable past’ in Serbian Nationalism,” Portal Journal of Multidisciplinary International Studies, Vol. 2, 
No. 2, July 2005, http://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/journals/portal/splash/. 
71 “Wiesenthal Center Welcomes Apology by Yugoslav Holocaust Historian”, The Simon Wiesenthal Center, 
Sneider Social Action Institute, 30 December 2002, www.wiesenthal.com; Paul Alster, “Man with a Mission: The 
Tireless Nazi Hunter Efraim Zuroff,” The Jerusalem Post, 4.02.2016, http://www.jpost.com/Jerusalem-Report/Man-
with-a-mission-446813. 
72 Joji Sakurai, “Make Croatia Great Again: How Fascism Emerged in the EU’s Youngest State. In the Croatian 
Heartlands, Economic Decline has Combined with Fears over Migration from the Middle East,” New Statesman, 
21.05. 2016,  http://www.newstatesman.com/culture/observations/2016/05/make-croatia-great-again-how-fascism-
emerged-eu-s-youngest-state. 
73 “The President of the Republic, Kolinda Grabar-Kitarović, received the Special Envoy for Holocaust Issues from 
the United States State Department, Nicholas Dean,” Official webpages of the President of Croatia, 11. 04. 2016, 
http://predsjednica.hr/objava/1/1/880. 
74 “Something has Turned Very Very Evil in Croatia Today”, Ephraim Zuroff Calls for Replacement of Secretary 
Hasanbegović” (“U Hrvatskoj je nešto jako, jako otišlo po zlu. Ephraim Zuroff traži smjenu Hasanbegovića”) 
Jutarnji List, 12.06. 2016, http://www.jutarnji.hr/vijesti/hrvatska/u-hrvatskoj-je-nesto-jako-jako-otislo-po-zlu-
ephraim-zuroff-trazi-smjenu-hasanbegovica/4428417/. 
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international conference on Holocaust in World War II Croatia, the Ustasha concentration camp 
Jasenovac, and the recent Croatian historical revisionism.75 However, no Israeli or any other 
Western observer of contemporary Croatian politics, have observed that the Croatian right-wing 
nationalist parties, much like their counterparts in Serbia, admire the Israeli army and policies of 
the State of Israel against Arabs in Palestine. For example, Croatia’s newly appointed 
commissioner for veteran affairs addressed his supporters in these words: “With the Church and 
God on our side we can succeed! Croatia’s role model will be Israel!”76 Another member of the 
new Croat cabinet, the leader of a far-right party, argued in a TV interview: “we are like Israel, 
Croatia lives in a strange surrounding … there is danger of new wars with Serbia …”77  
 In sum, political manipulations with the Holocaust and various “uses of the Jews” are 
neither new nor surprising practices on the part of religious extremists, nationalists, and 
historical revisionists. Regarding the recent Serbian nationalism’s strategy aimed at the making 
of a “special relationship” with Israel as an ally of post-Yugoslav Serbia capable of assisting 
Serbia in the acquisition of Kosovo and fighting Muslims and neo-Nazis elsewhere, the effort 
has produced ambiguous results. Only some private Jewish circles and individuals took the risk 
of involvement with the worldwide discredited Balkan nationalist politics. Regarding the 
government, Israel would show cautious support or sympathies for some initiatives, provided it 
would not contradict interests of the State of Israel. Finally, there is another reason why Serbia 
could never fully succeed in the making Israel a close ally and that reason is called Russia, never 
a friend of Israel. Abandoning Marshal Tito’s politics of balancing between Russia and the West, 
 
75 “World Jewish Congress against Historical Revisionism in Croatia” (“Židovski kongres protiv revizionizma u 
Hrvatskoj”), Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 23.10. 2017, https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/holokaust-
hrvatska/28813238.html. 
76 “Secretary Crnoja after Benediction Took Office. Croatia’s Role model will be Israel” (“Crnoja uz blagoslov 
preuzeo ured: Hrvatskoj će uzor biti Izrael”), Bljesak.info, 25.01.16, http://www.bljesak.info/mob/clanak/146037. 
77 Jutarnji list, 24.02. 2016,  http://www.jutarnji.hr/pravas-coric-pojasnio-zasto-bi-vratio-obvezni-vojni-rok--postoji-
opasnost-od-konflikta-sa-srbijom--mi-smo-kao-izrael--u-cudnom-okruzenju----/1527815/. 
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Serbia restored the old Slavic brotherhood with Russia. Concurrently, each of the new Balkan 
states breaking out of Yugoslavia sought its respective “kin country” internationally. The term 
come from Samuel P. Huntington who describes post-Cold War international alliances as 
cultural or civilizational alliances with a crucial role for religion (e.g. the Orthodox Christian 
Russians and Serbs; Bosnian Muslims and Turks; Catholic Croats and the Vatican, etc.)78 Thus, 
at least at the symbolic level, in ceremonial discourses and Church relations, the new post-
communist Russia-Serbia romance has been one of most remarkable features of post-communist 
Eastern Europe where everyone except Serbia continued to hate Russia. In reality, as Veljko 
Vujačić shows in a recent comparative study of Russia and Serbia, in the post-communist phase 
the two repeated the learning about their similarities as well as differences.79        
 
4.  From a Balkan Affair to the Clash of Civilizations 
“Sacred sites are the physical evidence of the perennial existence of the religious 
community and, by nationalist expansion, of the nation … The history of shrines, as told in 
religious tales, and established by archeological evidence, is the history of the nation.” 
 —Peter Van Der Veer, Religious Nationalism, 1994 
A “cosmic war” is an imagined battle between metaphysical forces- good and evil, right 
and wrong, order and chaos- that lies behind many cases of religion-related violence in the 
contemporary world. These transcendent spiritual images have been implanted onto the social 
and political scene, magnifying ordinary worldly conflict into sacred encounter… 
 
78 Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations, p.28. 
79 Veljko Vujačić, Nationalism, Myth, and the State in Russia and Serbia: Antecedents of the Dissolution of the 
Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015). 
 
OCCASIONAL PAPERS ON RELIGION IN EASTERN EUROPE (DECEMBER 2017) XXXVII, 6 55
 —Mark Juergensmeyer, Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious 
Violence,   2003 
 Let there be an endless struggle … Let there be what cannot be … On the grave, flowers 
will grow … For a distant future generation … 
 —Prince-Bishop of Montenegro Petar II Petrović –Njegoš (1847) 
  “Serbian Jerusalem” at face value looks a folk or pop cultural product, although it came 
“from above,” invented by the new post-communist Serb elite. Initially known only by close 
observers of the downfall of Yugoslavia, the phrase gained currency internationally during the 
NATO Balkan intervention and ensuing diplomatic battles over Kosovo independence. Although 
the metaphor and the Serb-Jewish comparisons are brainchildren of secular nationalists, the 
influence of religion has continuously increased since the movement’s origins. Often criticized 
for sectarian tendencies and an excessive ethnocentrism, the Serbian Orthodox Church in a post-
communist globalizing world, welcomed the internationalization and globalization of the Kosovo 
controversy. Like the former communists turned-nationalists seeking the same utopian thinking 
and authoritarian state they got used to yet only under different symbols and expressed by 
different discourses, Balkan clerical nationalists found the Jerusalem parallel, the Jewish 
analogies and comparative genocide, eye-opening global perspectives. Accordingly, the post-
communist Serbs disillusioned with Yugoslavia and seeking a new identity, could be re-
imagined as one of the most righteous, holy, and martyred nation in the world. In addition, global 
and comparative perspectives helped a regional affair in the notorious European periphery to 
become a global issue. Concurrently, from the Yugoslav collapse and the Balkan wars to the first 
decade of the twenty-first century, Serbian religious nationalism merged with a global 
resurgence of religion discovering new challenges and rivals in the rising fundamentalisms, 
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public and radicalized religions. The Serbian Church’s espousal of the discourse on Serbian 
Jerusalem and the Serb-Jewish analogy reached a pinnacle under the Patriarchate of the ardent 
religious nationalist Irenej Gavrilović enthroned in 2010 and has advanced ever since ignoring 
critics from some clerical and secular circles.  
 It is nonetheless worth noting that several Serb religious leaders and intellectuals refused 
to accept “Drašković’s metaphor,” its meanings and accessories. They found it inappropriate, 
confusing or at least awkwardly applied. Thus, the Serbian Patriarch Pavle (1990-2009), 
indicated that if there existed such a thing as “Serbian Jerusalem,” it should be about the saintly 
Church’s founder St. Sava and his original gravesite at the Mileševo monastery (which is in 
central Serbia and therefore, geographically, outside Kosovo).80 In other words, Jerusalem as 
metaphor denotes the holiest place—for the Serbs that must be the memorial site dedicate to the 
holiest among the saints, namely Saint Sava, therefore either the original gravesite at the 
Mileševo monastery or the Memorial Saint Sava temple in Belgrade. Similarly, the Serb 
religious scholar Mirko Đorđević, argued that because of the strong influence of secular 
nationalism on religion and church in Serbia, the main cult of St. Sava to inspire the faithful as a 
wise but not warlike statesman, diplomat, and peacemaker, was intentionally overshadowed by 
the cult of Prince Lazar martyred in the Kosovo battle of 1389 who symbolizes war and sacrifice. 
According to Đorđević, the Serbian Jerusalem discourse is not a religious but a quintessential 
nationalistic idea that invokes the emperor Dušan the Mighty and the old Serb imperial dream of 
state expansion across the Balkans restoring borders from the fourteenth century. 81 Indeed, 
Bishop Teodozije of Raška-Prizren invoked Dušan’s empire in a sermon held in April 2011 at 
the historic city of Prizren in Kosovo, which used to be Emperor Dušan’s capital: “The city of 
 
80 Radmila Radić, Patriarch Pavle, A Biography (Patrijarh Pavle, biografija). (Beograd: Tanjug-Novosti, 2005). 
81 Pavel Domonji and Ksenija Đorđević-Leonard, eds., Mirko Đorđević, Negativna svetosavska paralipomena. 
(Novi Sad, Serbia: VPA, 2015). 
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Prizren is our Jerusalem and our Constantinople. It used to be imperial capital of Tsar Dušan the 
Mighty with its holy shrines and its beauty to which the Serbs return while returning to 
Kosovo.”82 
 Yugoslav writer Mirko Kovač, in his collection of essays on Serbian nationalism noted 
yet another interpretation of the Serbian Jerusalem metaphor. In a tourist guidebook to 
northwestern Serbia, Kovač found description of what the people allegedly call “Serbian 
Jerusalem,” namely the new pilgrimage site at the monastery Lelić in the hills overlooking the 
town of Valjevo. 83 In recent decades, Serbs have begun paying tribute to two radical Serb 
clerical nationalists. Namely, the Lelić monastery is the burial place for two relatively recently 
canonized Serbian saints, both ardent religious nationalists, Bishop Nikolaj Velimirović and 
Archimandrite Justin Popović. Celebrated today as anticommunists and great Serbs, their 
fundamentalist, anti-Semitic, and anti-Catholic teachings have become increasingly influential in 
contemporary Serbia not only in church circles but also in intellectual life and public schools. 
They represent the new Serbian nationalist elite, responsible for the invention of discourses such 
as “Serbian Jerusalem,” and other ideas and myths that dragged Serbs and the neighboring 
Balkan peoples into the wars to the 1990s. 
 Concurrently, while the Serb nationalist elite argue over the best application of the 
Serbian Jerusalem metaphor and how to export it to the global political marketplace to Israel, the 
United States, EU, and elsewhere; the re-traditionalized Serbian society embraces the theme in 
folk music and popular culture. Thus, folk singer Milomir Miljanić Miljan, in his popular tune 
“Serbian Jerusalem” released in 2014, laments over the destruction of Serbian shrines and 
suffering of the Serbs in Kosovo and Metohija. Among the comments to the video, reads the 
 
82 “Episkop Teodosije: Prizren je srpski Jerusalim,” Nezavisne novine-Srna, 23.04. 2011,  
http://www.nezavisne.com/novosti/ex-yu/Episkop-Teodosije-Prizren-je-srpski-Jerusalim/87251 
83 Mirko Kovač, Elite that is Worse than Mob (Elita gora od rulje). (Zagreb: Fraktura, 2009). 
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following: “Serbia is going to be like it was in the age of the Dušan the Mighty Empire. Imperial 
Serbia!!!”84 
 After the 2004 Albanian militants’ damage of the Serbian Church’s property and 
monuments in Kosovo, the Belgrade government successfully lobbied the United Nations for the 
protections of the Serbian medieval shrines and monuments. In 2006, the United Nations 
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) released the following statement: 
“The World Heritage Committee decided to extend the site of the Dečani Monastery by adding 
to it three groups of churches, the Patriarchate of Peć Monastery, Gračanica Monastery, and the 
Church of the Virgin of Ljeviša. The site is now to be known as Medieval Monuments in 
Kosovo. The extended property, mainly dating from the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, was 
also placed on the List of World Heritage in Danger due to difficulties in its management and 
conservation stemming from the region's political instability. The Committee requested that the 
State Party (Serbia) work with UNESCO programs, with the United Nations Mission to Kosovo 
(UNMIK), and with the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government in Kosovo in caring for the 
site. The four edifices of the site reflect the high points of the Byzantine-Romanesque 
ecclesiastical culture that developed in the Balkans between the thirteenth and seventeenth 
centuries with its distinct style of wall painting. The Patriarchate of Peć Monastery is a group of 
four domed churches, on the outskirts of Peć featuring series of wall paintings. The thirteenth 
century frescoes of the Church of Holy Apostles are painted in an unique, monumental style. 
Early fourteenth century frescoes in the church of the Holy Virgin represent the appearance of 
the new so-called Palaiologian Renaissance style, combining the influences of the eastern 
 
84 Milomir Miljanić Miljan, “Srpski Jerusalim,” audio, 2014, https://youtu.be/12nWaYicsu8. 
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Orthodox Byzantine and the western Romanesque traditions. The style played a decisive role in 
subsequent Balkan art.”85 
 Since 2013, the Serbian church and state, have furthered the internationalization of the 
Kosovo controversy emphasizing cultural diplomacy and using the Church’s connections abroad. 
After a 2013 “Serbian Medieval Cultural Heritage Exhibition” at the House of Commons of the 
British Parliament in London, UK, a church and state-sponsored world tour presenting the Serb 
nationalist perspective on the Kosovo controversy, moved to the United States. After 
presentation of the sacred heritage of Kosovo in New York City in January 2015,86 the Library of 
Congress in Washington DC hosted a high delegation of Serbian Orthodox Church dignitaries 
presenting a new English-language monograph “The Christian heritage of Kosovo and Metohija: 
the Spiritual, Historical and Aesthetic Heart of the Serbian People.”87 The speakers at the event 
were Bishop Maxim of the Western American Diocese of the Serbian Orthodox Church in North 
America, Bishop Atanasije Jevtić from Serbia, and Archbishop Demetrios, Primate of the Greek 
Orthodox Church of America. The Bishop Atansije Jevtić, one of leading clerical zealots in the 
Balkans, urged “brothers Americans to understand better the cause and support the struggle for 
the endangered heritage of the Christian civilization.”88 He stated: 
In 2016 came the crown of Serbia’s imitation of the State of Israel’s policies in 
 Palestine. The Belgrade regime initiated the construction of settlements for Serbs 
 originally from the province who emigrated or have been expelled to Serbia by the 
 Albanians. In March 2016, the government of Serbia’s Office for Kosovo affairs, 
 announced a plan to relocate in Kosovo of 20,000 Serbs from Serbia through a project for 
 the construction of new settlements in the northern Serb enclaves of Kosovo, but also in 
 
85 UNESCO, “World Heritage Committee puts Medieval Monuments in Kosovo on Danger List and Extends Site in 
Andorra, Ending This Year’s Inscriptions,” 13.07.2006, http://whc.unesco.org/en/news/268. 
86 The Serbian Medieval Culture Legacy: Exhibit and Celebration, Columbia University Morningside Campus 
International Affairs Building Atrium, 15th floor, 23 January 2015, http://ece.columbia.edu/event/serbian-medieval-
culture-legacy-exhibit-and-celebration. 
87 The Christian Heritage of Kosovo and Metohija: The Spiritual, Historical and Aesthetic Heart of the Serbian 
People, Bishop Maxim (Vasiljević), editor-in-chief, Dušan T. Bataković, chief contributing editor, published by the 
Episcopal Council of the Serbian Orthodox Church in North America, (Los Angeles: Sebastian Press, 2014). 
88 This author attended the event at the Library of Congress on 10. February 2015. 
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 ethnically cleansed areas including the traditionally Albanian-populated south. The first 
 Serb settlement labeled “Sunny Valley” is planned in the northern Serb enclaves of 
 Zvečan and Mitrovica. In June 2016, Serbia’s state-run news agency announced that       
 the Serbian government Office for Kosovo-Metohija … laid the cornerstone for a 
 residential complex for returnees to the Kosovo-Metohija municipality. The complex … 
 to become home to around 1,500 returnees named Sunny Valley, is expected to have 300 
 housing units and other buildings … the start of construction works marks the 17th 
 anniversary of the start of the Serb exodus from Kosovo in 1999 … not a project of 
 hatred against anyone, but a project of love for our own nation, aimed at alleviating the 
 consequences of ethnic cleansing, bloody expulsions and extermination of Serbs in 
 Kosovo …”89  
 
 Kosovo Albanians view Serbia as an imperialist and colonizing force of the past and 
present. According to a western analysis of recent Balkan affairs, “authorities in Kosovo have 
intensified their criticism against the settlements project, which consists of the construction of 
300 homes in the North of Kosovo. According to them, the project which is funded by the Serb 
government is political and it aims at changing the structure of population in the north of 
Kosovo.”90 According to recent announcements by the Kosovo Albanian-dominated government, 
the settlement is an unlawful activity and dangerous politics that must be halted.91 Meanwhile, 
the construction continued and new ethnic clashes were reported around the Serb shrines in 
Kosovo celebrating Christian holidays and Serb anniversaries.  
 Concurrently, the Serbian Orthodox Church organized pilgrimages to the holy land of 
Kosovo, a new practice in Serbia’s culture and history. These patriotic tours of parishioners and 
lay activists affiliated to the Church, visitors from the Serb diaspora, tourist groups, military and 
police recruits, and school students, toured the historic Kosovo battlefield and the monasteries. 
Attacked sporadically by Albanian extremists, the new Serb pilgrims and settlers helped the 
 
89 “Cornerstone Laid for Returnee Residential Complex in Kosovo,” Tanjug Exactly, 9.06. 2016, 
http://www.tanjug.rs/full-view_en.aspx?izb=250974. 
90 Elton Tota, “ ‘Sun Valley’, the Serb Plan for the Division of Kosovo,” Independent Balkan News Agency, 14.06. 
2016, http://www.balkaneu.com/sun-valley-serb-plan-division-kosovo/#print. 
91 “Kosovo Vows to Halt Serb Refugee Settlement. The Serbian government-funded construction of a housing 
settlement for Serb refugees in northern Kosovo has angered Kosovo officials, who claim it is an attempt to extend 
Belgrade’s political influence.” BIRN, Balkan Transitional Justice, 1.07. 2016,  
http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/pristina-vows-to-halt-kosovo-serb-refugee-settlement-06-30-2016 
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continuous nationalist mobilization in Serbia. Apparently, the Israeli Settler Movement and the 
Israeli government’s construction of Jewish homes in occupied territories, have inspired Serbia’s 
new Kosovo strategies.92 Overall, the dominant Serbian interpretation of the meanings of 
Jerusalem, the Holy Land, and the history of mass persecution based on religious identity, have 
been rather narrow, secularized, and politicized. Evidently, Serbian nationalism has become 
essentially much closer to the post-1967 Israeli religious right and rightists Zionist groups, then 
to the broader spiritual and cultural meanings of the Holy city and the Holy Land as world’s 
heritage and places of encounters among civilizations.93 
 In sum, after losing wars in Kosovo and Croatia, while partly gaining only in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Serbian nationalism kept the regional focus by emphasizing memory and identity 
battles and diplomacy. Now that the new status of Kosovo as a holy land of the Serbs has been 
well established in Serbian post-Yugoslav collective identity and domestic politics and exported 
on a global political scene, Patriarch Irenej, in the following three recent statements has 
summarized the meaning of Kosovo for the Serbs today and what is to be done accordingly. 
 First, “Kosovo is not a geographic space but a holy land without which Serbia cannot 
exist.”94 Second, “Serbia simply cannot surrender or give away Kosovo in a territorial exchange 
or as a gift to anyone under any circumstances, Kosovo has always been ours and will remain 
ours.”95 Third, “Kosovo is at present an occupied Serbian land. It cannot be traded, partitioned or 
recognized as a foreign land but only liberated and returned to Serbia.” 96  
 
92 See more details on Israeli Settler Movement (Gush Emunim, etc.) and the policies of expansion of Jewish 
settlements in occupied territories: Idith Zertal and Akiva Eldar, Lords of the Land: The War Over Israel’s 
Settlements in the Occupied Territories, 1967-2007, translated from the Hebrew by Vivian Eden, (New York: 
Nation Books, 2007); Motti Inbari, Messianic Religious Zionism Confronts Israeli Territorial Compromises. (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2012). 
93 Karen Armstrong, A History of Jerusalem: One City, Three Faiths, (London: Harper Collins, 1996). 
94 Blic online, 11.07. 2012, www.blic.rs/vesti/politika/patrijarh-kosovo-nije...nego.../et9slh0. 
95 Vesti.rs online, 20.03. 2013, https://www.vesti.rs/Kosovo/Patrijarh-Irinej-Ni-priznanje-ni-podela 
96 Internemagazin.rs, 20.03. 2013, www.intermagazin.rs/patrijarh-spc-irinej-kosovo-je-okupirana-srps, 
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 To implement this strategy, the Serbian government pursues political and cultural 
diplomacy while the Church wages a holy war of its own in the Kosovo Republic while also 
seeking and receiving support among friendly churches such as notably the Russian Orthodox 
Church, the Orthodox Christian Patriarchate at Jerusalem, and the Orthodox Church of Greece. 
This does not mean that Serbia has totally abandoned armed battles and wars for Kosovo. For 
example, according to a publication titled Handbook for an Orthodox Soldier issued in 2012 by 
the Serbian Army, “the (Serb) Orthodox soldier’s duty is to secure the places of worship and 
establish stable conditions under which the Orthodox priest can celebrate the bloodless sacrifice 
to the Glory of Our Lord for the sins of the people and his own …”97  
 Kosovo’s present statehood has been a result of a combination of factors including the 
advancement of Albanian nationalism in Albania, Yugoslavia and subsequent Balkan ethnic 
struggles, and foreign interventionism. The United States and NATO established near the 
Kosovo town of Uroševac/Ferizaj, the largest military base in Eastern Europe, Camp Bondsteel. 
The grateful Albanians posted a massive bronze statue of President Bill Clinton in the Kosovo 
capital city of Priština and of Woodrow Wilson in the capital of Albania Tirana honoring the idea 
of U.S. assistance to small nations’ self-determination. Tirana also named streets and plazas after 
the two Bush presidents and, most recently, the Albanian town of Sarranda added a statue of the 
U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. Concurrently in Serbia, anti-Americanism has grown as 
well as pro-Russian sentiments.  
 In sum, Serbian nationalism has labored to “upgrade” the Kosovo controversy from an 
ethnic conflict in Europe’s periphery into a global affair comparable to Palestine. As the 
ethnologist Ivan Čolović has observed, the Kosovo myth is a state building project rather than 
 
97 Handbook for an Orthodox Soldier (Priručnik za pravoslavnog vojnika), priređivač teksta Goran Marić, 
recenzenti: pukovnik Vinko Markovski, protođakon mr Zlatko Matić, (Lapovo, 2012), p. 3. Quoted in 
Veljković,“Kosovo je srpski Jerusalim,” Peščanik, 28.11. 2015.  
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merely a folklore narrating the medieval battle and Church liturgy commemorating the canonized 
warriors. Since the nineteenth century, Čolović notes that the Kosovo narrative has evolved into 
an elite-constructed ideology and eventually imposed on the people as a religion of sorts in 
which the nation and state are worshiped as holy icons. 98Čolović goes on to argue that the 
national ideology using Kosovo as its banner is not an immutable mythology or tradition but a 
changing material revised as it suits the state and church elite, and will be revised further to 
adjust to the new globalizing world. In such a new world, according to Čolović, such ideologies 
and cultures of memory cannot as earlier coexist separately and isolated from one another; hence 
there will be more interactions among them including emulating, borrowing, and mutual 
influences.99  
  Understanding recent changes of the discourse about Kosovo also requires observing the 
post-communist and post-Yugoslav contexts. The new recent religious nationalist discourses 
have become striking features of post-communist, re-traditionalizing, and de-secularizing, earlier 
atheistic and anti-tradition modernizing societies. Unwilling to give up the privileged social 
status, the elites of former regimes publicly used the new symbols, discourses, tropes, and 
metaphors indicating the return of religion and tradition. The adoption of the religious 
nationalistic discourses and the pretense of religious conversions have routinely served the 
former communist elite to preserve the privileged social status and confirm identity mutation. As 
noted earlier, many leading post-communist nationalists used to be prominent communists. Some 
attempted religious conversions, other faked religiosity, and some simply used religion for 
political gains while remaining atheistic and openly cynical to which many religious leaders 
 
98 “Ivan Čolović, Nation and Religion are Being Forced upon Us from Above as Things Most Sacred” (“Ivan 
Čolović: Nasilno nam nameću naciju i veru kao svetinje”), Novosti, 11.06.2017. 
99 Čolović, Death on the Kosovo Field, p. 462. 
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responded favorably provided it served their clerical interests and the nationalist ideology they 
consecrated. Thus, the Croat nationalist historian and Holocaust denier Franjo Tudjman, was a 
retired Yugoslav communist army general turned into an ardent ethnic nationalist who made the 
Catholic Church the actual co-ruler of the state he founded and made himself president. 
Likewise, Slobodan Milošević, the communist-turned nationalist, as leader of post-communist 
Serbia could not hide his despise for religion and clergy yet always posed before TV cameras in 
the company of the Patriarch during every election campaign. Also, the chief Serb nationalist 
ideologue, the writer Dobrica Ćosić, was once a member of the Communist Party Central 
Committee. He never openly converted to the Serbian Orthodox Church yet worshiped in a 
zealously religious fashion the Kosovo myth and all that Kosovo symbolizes in Serb nationalism. 
Not to mention that the Serb nationalist writer Vuk Drašković, who claims to have invented the 
“Serbian Jerusalem” metaphor, used to be a senior Yugoslav communist official, Chief of staff 
under the (Croat) head of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia in the 1970s. Likewise, the current 
popular leader of Russia, Vladimir Putin, the former communist secret agent, justifies the 
Russian 2014 annexation of Crimea, in a religious nationalistic language emphasizing historic 
rights and drawing parallels with Jerusalem. Putin asserted that Crimea has “sacred meaning for 
Russia, like the Temple Mount for Jews and Muslims,” and that Crimea is “the spiritual source 
of the formation of the multifaceted but monolithic Russian nation … It was on this spiritual soil 
that our ancestors first and forever recognized their nationhood.”100 
 The second, post-Yugoslav context, unveils several new small European nation-states 
succeeding a large nation that during the Cold War era acquired the influence and reputation in 
international relations comparable only to European empires such as Austria-Hungary or 
Ottoman Turkey at its heights. After the ethnic nationalist euphoria and wars of the 1990s, these 
 
100 Paul Coyer, “Putin's Holy War and the Disintegration of the 'Russian World,” Forbes, 4.06. 2015. 
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new post-Yugoslav states woke up to grow increasingly frustrated as political and economic 
dwarfs, struggling transitional states discredited by the International War Crimes Tribunal 
sentences and exhausted by the prolonged nationalist strife and instability. The invention of 
“Serbian Jerusalem” is an example how these new post-Yugoslav small, isolated, and sect-like 
states vied for relevance, seeking way out of isolation and inferiority. The inventors and 
practitioners of the “Serbian Jerusalem” and similar new nationalist discourses, hoped to 
convince their domestic as well as foreign audiences of a greater importance in domains of 
culture, history, religion and ideas, purportedly exceeding the country’s actual size and modest 
economic and military potential. Similarly, Serbia’s nemesis Croatia, invented (with a little help 
from the United States) an international initiative labeled The Three Seas Initiative. Presenting 
the Initiative to Russian president Vladimir Putin, Croatia’s president Kolinda Grabar-Kitarović 
described Croatia as “a state small in size of its territory and population yet distinguished by its 
talents, ambitions, and new original ideas such as The Three Seas initiative aimed to bridge the 
chasm between Old and new Europe.”101  
 However, the new reality, after the disintegration of united Yugoslavia as a sizeable 
European country with a notable influence in the Third World, has unexpectedly dwarfed the 
small post-Yugoslav nations in a globalizing world. Nevertheless, their nationalist elites do not 
even think of abandoning the key tenets of their ideologies including notably the exaggeration of 
their importance in the world. According to historian Pål Kolstø’s study on nationalist myths, 
Serbs, Croats, Bosnians, and other small peoples of southeastern Europe have in common what 
he terms antemurale myth, that is, mythologized historical narratives portraying them as small in 
 
101“Russia: Croatian President Invites Moscow to Join an Anti-Russian Project” (“Rusija: Predsjednica Hrvatske 
pozvala Moskvu da se priključi antiruskom projektu”), Logicno.com, 23.10. 2017, 
https://www.logicno.com/politika/rusija-predsjednica-hrvatske-pozvala-moskvu-da-se-prikljuci-antiruskom-
projektu.html 
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size yet achieving great heroic and exceptional deeds and service in defense of the Western 
civilization.102 Thus, both Serbs and Croats claim to have protected Christian Europe standing in 
the first line of defense against the Muslim invader from the Middle East. Similarly, Serb 
nationalism views Serbia as the principal initiator and the most heroic participant in the First 
World War. Contemporary Serbian nationalism also finds a continuity of the Serbs’ sacrifice for 
Christian Europe in defense against an aggressive Islam, from the 1389 battle at the Kosovo 
Field to the wars in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo in the 1990s.103 The post-Yugoslav Serbia, 
Croatia, and other successor states of former Yugoslavia, except perhaps Slovenia, are 
internationally insignificant, impoverished, depopulated, struggling states with corrupt 
ineffective governments. While in Yugoslavia during the Cold War, they took for granted the 
international reputation and influence that Marshal Tito’s regime had acquired which was lost 
once Tito’s nation ceased to exist. After Yugoslavia, the new small ethnic nations’ inferiority 
complex has worsened and the exaggerated religion and myth function as survival kits for life in 
sect-like societies with a hostile and arrogant world paying no attention to them or even 
despising them. Their identities changed and the pride once bolstered by the secular modernizing 
and worldly Yugoslavia, turned into the pre-modern peasant mentality of small ethno-
confessional communities hating the neighbors while seeking approval from the significant 
international political and religious authorities, states, nations, and empires. 
 Today, a presumably most useful role for Serbia, Croatia, and Bosnia in international 
relations may be to deter and discourage separatist and secessionist movements. In other words, 
ethnic separatists and religious nationalists worldwide should cease their efforts unless they risk 
ending up like Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia and other pathetic leftovers of Yugoslavia. Pope Francis, 
 
102 Pål Kolstø, ed., Myths and Boundaries in South-Eastern Europe. (London: Hurst. & Company, 2005), pp. 19-21. 
103 See Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations, pp. 286-290. 
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Barack Obama, and several other world leaders, have recently warned of the risky separatist 
nationalism manipulating temporary euphoria without realistically anticipating the consequences. 
In 2014 and 2016, Pope Francis spoke about the danger of a “balkanization of Europe and the 
world,” commenting on separatist tendencies in Scotland, Catalonia, and the Brexit.104 
 In present-day Serbia, for example, the nearly four decades of the nationalistic pressures 
on society created some kind of a permanent state of siege, turning the one-time open and 
worldly modernizing society into a sectarian and backward state in Europe’s periphery. Yet, 
according to the Serbian nationalist regime and its allied national church, the worse the situation 
gets, the greater becomes the influence of the new religious nationalism keeping them in power. 
The Church teaches that remedy is an endless struggle and self-sacrifice, as lessons learned from 
the Kosovo myth and Serbia’s sacred history. Church zealots often refer to the Prince-Bishop of 
Montenegro Petar Petrović II-Njegoš according to whom collective self-sacrifice is necessary 
and losses are only temporary, because, “there is no Resurrection without death,” hence, “Let 
there be an endless struggle … Let there be what cannot be … On the grave, flowers will grow 
… For a distant future generation …”105 The philosophy under consideration prevailed in Serbia 
during moments of crisis, under foreign occupation or in wars. For a foreign observer, even in 
the case of the most sympathetic visitors to Serbia like British novelist Rebecca West, some 
features of “Balkan mentality” are appalling:                                  
 
104 In a 2014 interview, Pope Francis spoke about secessionism in Catalonia and Scotland. The breakup of nations, 
the pontiff said, worried him but Spain and Britain would expectedly avert the tragedy of balkanization unlike the 
former Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia’s disintegration, said the pope, was unavoidable because “the cultures that made up 
that country were so diverse they couldn’t even be stuck together with glue” (“Pope Voices Fears over Scottish 
Independence,” The Telegraph, 13.06. 2014). Again, the pope discussed the balkanization theme in the wake of 
“Brexit,” a referendum potentially balkanizing both Britain and the European Union. “No to balkanization because it 
is a threat to the EU,” said the pope according to the world’s media releases, (Vatican Insider, 26.06. 2016). 
 
105 Quoted in translation by Aleksandar Hemon, “Genocide’s Epic Hero. How Radovan Karadzic Made Bosnia 
Suffer,” The New York Times, op-Eds, 27. 07. 2008.  
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On the Sheep’s Field I had seen sacrifice in its filth and falsehood, and in its astonishing 
power over the imagination. There I had learned how infinitely disgusting in its practice 
was the belief that by shedding the blood of an animal one will be granted increase; that 
by making a gift to death one will receive a gift of life. There I had recognized that this 
belief was a vital part of me, because it was dear to the primitive mind, since it provided 
an easy answer to various perplexities, and the primitive mind is the foundation on which 
the modern mind is built. This belief is not only hideous in itself: it pollutes the work of 
love. It has labored for annulment of the meaning of Christianity, by insinuating itself 
into the Church and putting forward, by loose cries and the drunkenness of ecstasy, a 
doctrine of the Atonement too absurd to be set down in writing.106  
 
 In a similar vein, Serbian literary critic Miodrag Popović deconstructs the Kosovo myth 
in the 1970s anticipating it as the fuel for new conflicts. He finds that Serbian nationalism fuses 
“the real popular liberation and national emancipation struggle, with the surviving pagan 
instincts and drives, such as revenge, torture, slaughter, sacrificial rituals and the symbolic 
communication with heroic ancestors, thus indicating that the human society under consideration 
harbors untamed mythical impulses and archaic behavioral patterns …” and concludes: 
This kind of archaic, pre-modern, or simply, “barbaric” behavior, might have served the 
purpose of community survival at some points in history, yet, if and when the mythical 
archaic thinking becomes a lasting mental attitude, collective mentality or national 
culture, institutionalized as a major national patriotic myth and a key collective identity 
component, it may become fatal to the people incapable of resisting its pseudohistorical 
spell. The contemporary nationalist intellectuals, captives of these myths and pseudo 
histories, are not like the early Western European romantic nationalist poets; they present 
the contemporary thought and the spirit of modern man running the risk of witnessing a 
new Kosovo, facing the intellectual and ethical defeat.107  
 
  In a final analysis, the above described nationalist discourses and invented traditions 
obscure the nation-building failure, social decay and longstanding conflicts that the nationalist 
elite have created. Both Serbia and Kosovo are nearly failed struggling states. Serbs as well as 
Albanians from both Kosovo and Albania join the regional waves of mass migration to Western 
 
106 West, Black Lamb and Grey Falcon, p. 914. 
107 Miodrag Popović, St.Vitus Day and the Honorable Cross (Vidovdan i časni krst), (Belgrade: Biblioteka xx vek, 
2007), pp.169-170. 
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Europe leaving many areas in the Balkan macro region virtually deserted.108 Concurrently, an 
extremist Islamism advances in Muslim areas of the Kosovo, Macedonia, the Sanđak and 
Bosnia-Herzegovina.109 Imported mainly from Saudi Arabia and other conservative gulf states, 
Kosovo Islamism, according to a New York Times report, recruited 314 Kosovars, including two 
suicide bombers, 44 women and 28 children—who have gone abroad to join the Islamic State, 
the highest number per capita in Europe.110 According to an analysis based on a study of 
Kosovars fighting in the war in Syria, their motives include young people’s lack of employment 
and opportunities for normal life in their own country combined with the influences of ethnic 
nationalist and militant Wahhabi and Jihad ideologies.111 
 Since 2004, Albanian nationalists in Kosovo have sporadically attacked Serb 
monasteries, clergy, pilgrims and visitors. The international peacekeepers of the NATO-led 
Kosovo Force (KFOR) protect the Serb enclaves from Albanian extremists. The Serbian Church 
asked for a permanent exemption from the local civilian administration, yet KFOR terminated 
the operation entrusting the guard duty at the Serb monasteries and churches to the local 
Albanian authorities. The move angered Serb nationalists and their Russian supporters.112 At this 
writing, Kosovo is formally a sovereign nation and even an EU candidate. Yet, five out of 28 EU 
member states do not want to recognize Kosovo’s independence for the same reasons as Israel, 
that is, to discourage secessionist movements such as in Catalonia, Scotland, and Palestine.  
 
108 “More than 43% of the population has left Bosnia Herzegovina,” Al Jazeera Balkans, 2. 02. 2017, 
http://balkans.aljazeera.com/vijesti/iz-bih-otislo-43-posto-stanovnistva. 
109 Gordon N. Bardos, “Jihad in the Balkans: The Next Generation,” World Affairs, Summer/October 2014,  
http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/jihad-balkans-next-generation. 
110 Carlotta Gall, “How Kosovo Was Turned Into Fertile Ground for ISIS. Extremist clerics and secretive 
associations funded by Saudis and others have transformed a once-tolerant Muslim society into a font of 
extremism,” The New York Times, 21.05. 2016,  http://mobile.nytimes.com/2016/05/22/world/europe/how-the-
saudis-turned-kosovo-into-fertile-ground-for-isis.html?_r=0. 
111 Brenna Gautam, “From Pristina to Damascus – Understanding Kosovo’s Fighters in Syria,” Transconflict, 26.09. 
2016, http://www.transconflict.com/2016/09/from-pristina-to-damascus-understanding-kosovos-fighters-in-syria-
269/. 
112 “Serbian Monasteries Endangered by Transfer of Guard to Kosovo Police,”  Православие.ru, 9.08. 2010,  
http://www.pravoslavie.ru/english/38619.htm 
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 The Serbian Orthodox Church under Patriarch Irenej, approves the comparisons between 
Serbs and Jews hoping for the support that Israel receives from the West and also to emphasize 
what Marko Živković describes as the narrative of “eternal victimization.”113 In order to update 
and “globalize” the victimization theme, the Church compares the suffering of the Serbs not only 
with the Holocaust but also with Turkish genocide against Armenians in the First World War. In 
August 2016, at a rally commemorating a massive Serb refugee movement from Croatia to 
Serbia and Bosnia at the end of the 1991-1995 war, the Patriarch Irenej stated:  
Today we remember the suffering of our people at hands of the Croat military and police 
in the operation “Storm” in August 1995. The aim of that crime was to expel Serbs from 
the provinces, towns and villages where they lived for many centuries and to cleanse 
Croatia from Serbs and Orthodox Christianity. Thus continued the terror against Serbs in 
Croatia from the Second World War. Then, we remember, in the Croat fascist Ustasha 
state Serbs were murdered in concentration camps … the Ustasha regime even set up a 
concentration camp for Serb children with more than 120,000 innocent child victims, 
most of which died from hunger and thirst … Only Jews and Armenians, besides Serbs, 
have seen such a Golgotha …114 
 
 The Serbian Church leader has repeated the Armenian analogy several times since. Thus, 
in October 2017 during his visit to the Serb Republic in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the patriarch made 
the following statement, triggering protests from the Bosnian Islamic Religious Authority: 
Wherever Serbs live, there is Serbia: not just in Serbia proper but in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
Vojvodina, Montenegro and other places. All Serbs, wherever they live in the world, 
should unite in the thinking about our people’s glorious history… The twentieth century 
was so glorious yet tragic for the Serbs, that human history never recorded such a grave 
suffering of a people. It seems that the suffering of the Serbs exceeded the gravity of the 
calamities of Jewish and Armenian peoples…115 
 
 The patriarch’s reference to the Armenian genocide, along with the familiar Serb-Jewish 
analogies, is the most recent update to the victimization theme and the Church’s adjustment to a 
 
113 Marko Zivkovic, “The Wish to be a Jew”, p. 69. 
114 Al Jazeera Balkans, 4.08. 2016. In my free translation from http://balkans.aljazeera.net/vijesti/vucic-oluja-vise-
nece-biti.  
115 “The Islamic Community Condemns Patriarch Irenej’s Statements,” Al Jazeera Balkans, 25. 10. 2017, 
http://balkans.aljazeera.net/vijesti/islamska-zajednica-bih-osuduje-izjave-patrijarha-irineja. 
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globalizing world. The Church welcomes recent resolutions and pronouncements on the 
Armenian genocide from the Vatican, Germany, France, and eleven other EU members.116 
Apparently, the Church of Serbia is hoping for a similar international recognition regarding 
genocide against Serbs during the Second World War in the wartime Croat pro-Nazi state. Pope 
Francis has recently initiated a conference on this controversy between representatives of the 
Croat Catholic and Serb Orthodox Churches but the effort discontinued without an agreement.117 
The two countries and their churches repeatedly tried to invite Israel as a judge but Israel 
abstained. However, the Yad Vashem institution has twice denied petitions to give the Croat 
Cardinal Stepinac—the church leader and the chief military vicar during the Ustasha state, whom 
the Church wants to canonize for sainthood, the title “Righteous among the Nations.” In the 
meantime, the image of an eternally suffering and morally righteous Serbia has been tarnished by 
Serbia’s role in the Balkan wars of the 1990s. By now, it has been determined by international 
war crimes tribunals and independent human rights groups that a large number of Serb political 
and military leaders committed war crimes and ethnic cleansing against Bosniak Muslims, 
Croats, and Albanians.118  
 According to Serbian nationalism’s efforts to address the world’s audience, it seems no 
longer the notorious “Balkanist” and orientalist phenomenon endemic in the notorious European 
 
116 “German Parliament Recognizes Armenian Genocide, Angering Turkey,” The New York Times, 2. 06. 2016,  
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118 For example, in the Bosnian war alone (not to mention the wars in Kosovo and Croatia) specifically during the 
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periphery. Instead, contemporary Serbian religious nationalism as well as the neighboring ethnic 
nationalisms in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina follow the pattern of the new global religious 
nationalism in a changing de-secularizing and globalizing world. The struggles over historic 
monuments and holy places representing nothing less than the entire past and present of nations 
and civilizations effectively influenced politics and government, mobilized masses, and drew 
international attention. The crucial role of religion and manipulations with history create an 
autonomous dimension of the conflict appearing as “eternal,” “ancient,” and not merely abut 
land but about “identity,” “soul,” etc. This aspect of the conflict, regardless of whatever 
pragmatic political solutions—even most radical such as partitions—in most cases precludes a 
complete resolution. When conflicts involved disputes over historic sacred monuments and 
consecration of land, resolution seems practically impossible. The controversy over “Serbian 
Jerusalem” shares a number of similarities for example, with the Hindu-Muslim conflict over the 
historic mosque/Hindu temple at Ajodhya in the 1990s, and the Jewish-Arab clashes since the 
1960s over the Temple Mount in Jerusalem.119 The most recent efforts by the inventors of the 
“Serbian Jerusalem” idea aim at presenting the Kosovo conflict in the global context. 
Accordingly, holy places such as Kosovo (in the Balkans) and Jerusalem (in Palestine) are major 
battlefields in an ongoing global “clash of civilizations.” In order to prove the thesis, two 
recently produced French and Serb documentary films highlight the Albanian attacks on the 
Kosovo medieval churches and monasteries.120 Author of the Serbian documentary “Kosovo: A 
Moment in Civilization” (Belgrade, 2017), Boris Malagurski, explains: “the script writer, a 
 
119 Wendy Pullan, Maximilian Sternberg, Lefkos Kyriacou, Craig Larkin and Michael Dumper, The Struggle for 
Jerusalem's Holy Places. (New York: Routledge, 2013); Gershom Gorenberg, The End of Days: Fundamentalism 
and the Struggle for the Temple Mount. (New York: Free Press, 2000); Magnus Ranstorp, “Interpreting the Broader 
Context and Meaning of Bin‐Laden's Fatwa,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Vol. 21, No. 4, (1998), pp. 321-330. 
120 “Kosovo: Christianity in Danger” (Kosovo,une chrétienté en peril), directed by Eddy Vicken, Kosovo: Hrišćanski 
svet u opasnosti), https://youtu.be/Dy4wcIATfCw; “Kosovo: A Moment In Civilization,” directed by Boris 
Malagurski, Belgrade, 2017, https://youtu.be/inyIPUZ_vyg. 
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young Christian theologian from Belgrade, suggests to the viewers that the Kosovo theme is not 
a local affair but concern for the entire Christian civilization … therefore the medieval 
monasteries of Kosovo must be defended and the Albanian Kosovo Republic blocked from 
becoming a member of UNESCO …”121 
 Overall, the Kosovo battle is itself a metaphor rather than an episode or a historical 
moment denoting a process that changes forms and dynamics and is far from complete. 
Nationalist elites seeking world’s attention have engineered its recent internationalization and 
globalization drawing comparisons with internationally better-known issues they found 
analogous. Religious nationalists today view globalization as an opportunity as well as 
imperative to upgrade local and regional conflicts as global clashes and present them on the 
world stage using increasingly the technological innovations of the global age. Religion is as 
ever an ambivalent force in history and society. While religious activists engage in 
humanitarianism, peacemaking, and conflict resolution, religious nationalists simultaneously 
labor in the opposite direction. Although religion per se tends to de-secularize and consecrate 
reality not to mention mythologizing history, in some cases it may aggravate and cement 
conflicts. They often make resolvable conflicts “eternal.” As Mark Juergensmeyer argues, 
religion often complicates, magnifies, and cements cultural, territorial, and political conflicts that 
may be resolved without the religious meaning and influence. “When a struggle becomes 
sacralized,” Juergensmeyer argues, “incidents that might previously have been considered minor 
skirmishes or slight differences of understanding are elevated to monumental proportions… 
Those who had been simple opponents become instead cosmic foes. The process of satanization 
can transform a worldly struggle into a contest between martyrs and demons. Alas, this 
 
121 SD Srbija danas, 22. 08. 2017, https://www.srbijadanas.com/vesti/info/albanci-ce-tek-paniciti-zbog-srpskog-
filma-o-kosovu-jer-poruka-na-kraju-filma-ledi-zile-u-venama-2017-08-22 
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inescapable scenario of hostility does not end until the mythology is redirected or until one side 
or the other has been destroyed …”122 
 To conclude, as noted in the introduction to this article, from the First World War and the 
Paris Peace conference to the present, the idea of national self-determination has remained highly 
attractive yet unarticulated and difficult to implement. The centennial of national self-
determination unveils a history of conflicts over who, when, and how claims the right to national 
self-determination and how to redefine state borders and territory in former imperial domains or 
ethnically heterogeneous sates with separatist movements. The examined case of Serbian 
nationalism in Kosovo paralleled by nationalist discourses to Israel-Palestine, exemplifies 
presumably the most complex and troubled cases. The conflict arises from contesting territorial 
claims between movements claiming territory in which it constitutes a majority of the 
population, against movements seeking nationhood that fuses religion and nationality, while 
justifying territorial claims by religious myths, invented traditions, and sacred historical 
monuments. When a nationalist rivalry involves holy lands, religious identities, and religious 
myths as key elements of national ideologies, such conflicts, to invoke Winston Churchill’s quip 
about the Catholic-Protestant conflict in Northern Ireland, will be resolved on Doomsday.   
 
122 Mark Juergensmeyer, Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence. (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 2003). Quoted from M. Juergensmeyer, “Cosmic War” in The Oxford Research Encyclopedia of 
Religion, Global Perspectives on Religion, Religion and Politics, Oxford University Press USA, 2016.  
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Mileusnić, S. ed., 2001. Monasteries of Serbia: Large Illustrated Encyclopedia, vols. 1-2, translation into English 
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Popović, M. 2007. Vidovdan i časni krst, Belgrade: Biblioteka xx vek. 
 
Pullan,W. Sternberg,M., Kyriacou, L., Larkin C, and Dumper,M. 2013. The Struggle for Jerusalem's Holy Places, 
New York: Routledge.  
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